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Abstract
Real life decision-making frequently involves some level of affect, and research has
demonstrated that individuals decide differently when outcomes are more or less rich with
feeling. This difference in choice has previously been attributed to probability insensitivity in the
presence of affect. In a series of three studies, we explored this possibility, while also testing
alternative explanations, namely, that differences exist because of outcome characteristics such
as comparability or precision. Individuals made choices between affect-rich side effects and
affect-poor monetary lotteries in either a strictly numeric format, or with the addition of an icon
array. Across the three studies we found little evidence that the icon array was beneficial, casting
doubt on the previous explanation that differences in affect-rich and affect-poor choice are due to
probability insensitivity. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find evidence that differences in
choice could be attributed to outcome comparability, as there continued to be decrements in
affect-rich choice, despite making affect-rich outcomes more comparable. As predicted, when
precision in each affective context was better equated by describing monetary outcomes in less
precise terms, the difference in affect-rich and affect-poor choice disappeared. It appears that it is
difficult to choose well when outcomes are vague, which we suggest is potentially the result of a
challenge integrating probability and outcome information. This research is a first step in
providing a viable explanation for the “affect gap” and contributes to our understanding of how
and why affect-rich and affect-poor choice may differ.
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An Examination of Underlying Causes for Differences in Affect-rich and Affect-poor
Choice
Each day individuals make countless decisions and, in a majority of cases, these
decisions involve some level of affect. Affect can be described most simply as good or bad
feeling states that are experienced when encountering various stimuli and situations. For many
years, emotional components like affect were disregarded when theorizing about how individuals
make choices. However, evidence has shown that affect is not only a component of the decisions
we make, but fundamental to our choices.
Throughout life we must frequently make choices between options that involve both
affect and some level of risk. For example, we may need to decide which route to take to work in
hopes of avoiding a potential traffic jam and the feelings associated with being late.
Nevertheless, some decisions involve more affect than others. Making some financial decisions
involving risk, such as those about monetary investments, may be less affect-rich. Moreover,
these kinds of decisions tend to be based on more quantitative strategies that incorporate
estimates of likelihoods and various possible monetary outcomes. In contrast, many affect-rich
decisions involve outcomes that are more vivid and less easily quantified; for example,
medication side effects. In these cases, quantitative strategies seem less applicable. As a result,
qualitative aspects of outcomes may become more central to the decisions, and likelihoods may
tend to be neglected.
The present research explores potential causes for differences in processing risky choices
when outcomes are more and less rich with affect. We assessed whether these differences in
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risky choice are likely to result from differences in attention to likelihoods, or differences in the
nature and precision of affect-rich qualitative outcomes versus affect-poor quantitative outcomes.
To do this, we will build off recent work by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic,
2012; Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015), who argue that
there is an “affect gap,” wherein differences in choice between affect-rich and affect-poor
outcomes are attributed to affect. They produced evidence that less attention is typically paid to
likelihoods in the presence of affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes, causing decisions to be of
lower quality in the presence of affect. We provided a critical test of this conclusion, and
explored the possibility that the differences in choice may be more closely tied to fundamental
differences in the nature of the outcomes assessed in the affect-rich and affect-poor contexts. If
affect tends to impede attention to likelihoods, then increasing the salience of and ease of
processing probability information should improve affect-rich decisions, increasing the similarity
between affect-rich and affect-poor choices.
Alternatively, or in addition, it may be that affect-rich outcomes such as medical side
effects are simply harder to compare to one another (e.g., fever versus memory loss) than affectpoor monetary amounts (e.g., $15 versus $30). Unlike monetary outcomes, side effects do not
necessarily share the same attributes. Side effects may also be fundamentally more vague, or
less precise, than monetary amounts. We tested whether either or both of these are likely to
contribute to differences in risky choice across affect-rich and affect-poor contexts. In this way,
we explored whether the affect gap was likely to exist because different psychological processes
are required to process qualitative versus quantitative outcomes.

3
The Role of Affect in Choice
Over the last 40 years there has been an outpouring of research dedicated to
understanding the role of affect and emotion in decision making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005;
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Though affect is
present in most decisions we make, there is debate about whether and when it is helpful or a
hindrance (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). For example, affect may be helpful when we use it to
inform our choices with information about how we expect to feel in the future with a given
outcome. However, it can become a hindrance when feelings not related to the decision (e.g., an
underlying mood state) influence our choice behavior.
The introduction of the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio (1994) provided a pivotal
demonstration that affect was not only important in guiding choice, it was also necessary for
individuals to make choices advantageously. The somatic marker hypothesis is a neurobiological
approach to choice positing that interactions with stimuli produce visceral “markers,” which are
brain and/or bodily states that signify the feeling state produced by the stimuli. These visceral
reactions are hypothesized to be utilized either consciously or unconsciously in judgment and
choice to help guide individuals in making advantageous decisions, steering them away from
decisions that may be disadvantageous (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).
The research on the somatic marker hypothesis highlights the importance of visceral
reactions and affective responses in guiding choice advantageously. Utilizing a card task in
which there is varied reward and punishment, Bechara and Damasio (2005) found that
individuals learned to avoid selecting cards from decks that were disadvantageous in the long
run, and hypothesized this was done through utilizing the somatic markers (visceral feelings) to
guide their decision behavior. In individuals with brain damage to areas responsible for
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generating or integrating information related to visceral feelings, there were more
disadvantageous choices with many patients failing to recognize which decks were likely to lead
to losses. This disadvantageous decision making was also reflected in real world decision making
deficits, for example, incurring financial losses, and losses in social standing and friendships.
Evidence from research supporting the somatic marker hypothesis is one step towards providing
an understanding of the potentially beneficial role of affective components in descriptive choice
behavior.
Whereas the somatic marker hypothesis has been pivotal for recognizing the beneficial
role that affect can play in decision making, affective contributors can also lead to behaviors that
might not be exhibited when affect is not present. One example can be found in the relationship
between immediate emotions about events and thoughts about future events (Loewenstein,
1996). Immediate emotions can be influenced by things such as vividness, which leads to an
intensification of these emotions, and in turn impacts decision behavior. If vividness does not
provide a cue to more beneficial choices, it can harm the quality of decision making. As an
example, Loewenstein (1996) points to research on purchases of earthquake insurance. Research
has found that purchases for the insurance rise directly after earthquakes, when the objective
probability of another earthquake is likely at a low point, but when the emotional reactions
associated with the outcome of another earthquake are at a peak (Palm, Hodgson, Blanchard, &
Lyons, 1990, as cited in Loewenstein, 1996). This is one example in which an increase in affect
can dominate decision making and lead to behaviors that may not otherwise be exhibited in the
absence of strong affective feelings.

5
Attention to probability in affect-rich and affect-poor contexts
Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2014;
Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2016) have conducted several studies exploring decision behavior in
affect-rich and affect-poor contexts. The authors have been interested in understanding potential
systematic differences in choices and underlying decision strategies in these contexts. They were
motivated by work from Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), who demonstrated probability
insensitivity and differences in preferences when outcomes were affect-rich versus affect-poor.
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that at a low probability (1% likelihood), individuals would
pay more to avoid an affect-rich outcome (electric shock) than a similarly-valued affect-poor
outcome (monetary loss); however, at a high probability (99% likelihood), preferences reversed,
such that individuals would pay more to avoid the affect-poor outcome than the affect-rich one.
Thus, the affect-rich outcome was more aversive at a low probability and the affect-poor
monetary loss became more aversive at a high probability. This inconsistency in preference was
replicated with other affect-rich outcomes (potential kisses from movie stars, European vacation
coupons), suggesting that the method for weighting probabilities of outcomes relies on the nature
of the outcome itself (e.g., affect-rich versus affect-poor).
A standard assumption of traditional models of decision making under risk is that choice
is based on a process that resembles calculation of expectations. These expectations are sums
based on the multiplicative combination of the subjective value, or utility, of outcomes and their
respective probabilities. Whereas research has demonstrated that expectation-based models can
often provide a good fit for choices among outcomes that are relatively affect-poor (Glockner &
Pachur, 2012), the results of studies by Pachur and colleagues demonstrate that these models
may not describe affect-rich choice as well. Specifically, their results showed that individuals
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tend to make decisions consistent with using strategies that discount or even ignore probability
when making choices about affect-rich outcomes compared with those that are affect poor.
To investigate how choice and strategy use are influenced by the presence of affect,
Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Herwig,
2015) used a lottery task to examine preferences for outcomes that elicited strong affective
feelings (medical side effects or hotel amenities) versus those that did not (monetary outcomes).
In one affect-rich context, participants indicated their preferences by making choices between
medications that each had a specified side effect that would occur with some probability,
otherwise no side effect would occur. Figure 1 shows an example of one of their lottery pairs
involving side effects. The top lottery, Medication A, presents a 15% chance of experiencing
fever and an 85% chance of no side effects, while the bottom lottery, Medication B, presents a
10% chance of experiencing insomnia and a 90% chance of no side effects.

Figure 1. Example affect-rich stimuli from Pachur & Galesic, 2012.

To make comparisons between choice behavior in affect-rich and affect-poor domains,
affect-poor equivalents needed to be constructed. To create these lotteries, the researchers
generated monetary outcomes using a willingness-to-pay (WTP) task. WTP is a way to estimate
the value that someone places on a commodity. It is a form of contingent valuation, in which
preferences are revealed through the monetary amount an individual is willing to pay to acquire a
desired commodity or avoid an undesirable commodity. In the WTP task used by Pachur and
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colleagues, participants indicated how much they would be willing to pay to avoid the possibility
of a side effect.
Utilizing the WTP task, monetary equivalents were generated for each of the possible
affect-rich outcomes. These equivalents were paired with the same probabilities utilized in the
affect-rich lotteries to create the affect-poor lotteries for choice, an example of which is
displayed in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Example affect-poor stimuli from Pachur & Galesic, 2012.

Decision behavior under risk was assessed in affect-rich and affect-poor contexts by
comparing the proportion of choices of the lottery with the higher expected value (EV), which
refers to the average amount that would be won or lost if playing the lottery many times. It is
calculated by multiplying the monetary outcome by the paired probability. For example, in a
lottery that presents a 10% chance of winning $50, the EV of that lottery is $5 (i.e., $50 x .10 =
$5). The WTP value obtained in the affect-poor lotteries was also used as an estimate of EV in
the affect-rich lotteries. For example, the WTP value associated with insomnia would be utilized
with the probability displayed in the lottery containing insomnia for the purpose of determining
that lottery’s EV.
In their studies, Pachur and colleagues repeatedly found that individuals selected the
lottery with the higher EV more often in the affect-poor than affect-rich context; thus, exhibiting
a pattern of preferences that would be better in the long run in the affect-poor context. This was
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true even though the problems were matched to be monetarily equivalent. The results
demonstrated that participants had systematically different preferences for a lottery pair when it
was presented in affect-rich terms than when it was presented as an ostensibly equivalent lottery
pair with affect-poor monetary outcomes. Pachur and colleagues (2014) refer to as the “affect
gap,” signifying that differences in choice exist because of the presence of affect.
To help explain why the affect gap occurred, Pachur and colleagues examined the
potential strategies that might have been used in each affective context. With the goal of
modeling the underlying cognitive processes contributing to this affect gap, the researchers’
explored strategies that take probability into account, EV calculation, as well as others that do
not. One example of a strategy that does not utilize probability is minimax, in which an
individual selects the lottery with the least bad outcome to minimize the maximum regret that
could be associated with incurring the worst outcome. In the gain domain the counterpart is a
maximax strategy, in which an individual selects the lottery with the best outcome to try and
maximize the best feeling, which is associated with the highest payoff. The examination of
strategy use revealed differences in the strategies that were utilized in affect-rich and affect-poor
choices. For affect-poor problems, choices were best described by the use of EV calculations,
which takes probability into account. Conversely, in the affect-rich problems, the dominant
pattern of preferences was most often consistent with strategies that ignore probability, such as
minimax or a maximax. As an additional step to test the acquisition of probability information in
choice, the authors utilized a process tracing methodology to analyze how often participants
chose to acquire information on probability versus outcomes. Both probability and outcome
information was “hidden,” and participants clicked on the respective boxes to reveal the
appropriate information. Results demonstrated that both probabilities and outcomes were
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acquired equally in affect-poor problems; however, probability information was acquired less
than outcomes in affect-rich problems. In the affect-rich context, individuals tended to focus
more on the outcomes upon which the decision was being made.
Pachur and colleagues (2014) further examined whether differences in choice are due to
differences in probability weighting, by fitting choices in both the affect-rich and affect-poor task
to cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). CPT is an expectation-based
model that allows for weighting on both the outcome and probability. It utilizes a subjective
value function to transform objective values, as well as a decision weighting function for
likelihoods. Pachur and colleagues (2014) were interested in testing a hypothesis previously put
forth by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), which posited that affect-rich choice is characterized by
a more strongly inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. This shape would indicate
probability discounting in choice because a change in objective probability is not proportional to
the change in the subjective decision weight. Results supported this hypothesis in the affect-rich
domain. However, a comparison of CPT and minimax for affect-rich choice revealed that both
models similarly accounted for choice. Therefore, Pachur and colleagues (2014) concluded that
individuals are at least discounting, if not ignoring, probability when making decisions in the
affect-rich context.
In a follow up study, Suter, Pachur, and Hertwig (2015) utilized the same paradigm to
further assess to what extent individuals are sensitive to probability in affect-rich choice. In
previous research, Pachur and colleagues (2014) used aggregate data to understand the strategies
behind choice; however Suter, Pachur, and Hertwig (2015) were interested in identifying how
probabilities are weighted at the individual level. To do this, they fit individual choices in the
lottery task to CPT and the minimax strategy (Savage, 1951). They found that CPT, which is a
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strategy that incorporates probability, was a better model fit for affect-poor choices than affectrich choices. Moreover, in the affect-rich lottery problems, the proportion of individuals best
described by minimax, which is a strategy that ignores probability, was notably higher. Thus, the
pattern of model fit provided evidence that individuals are less inclined to utilize probability in
the affect-rich lotteries.
In an effort to explore the neurocognitive mechanisms behind the strategies involved in
affect-rich and affect-poor choice, Suter, Pachur, Hertwig, Endestad, and Biele (2015) uncovered
evidence of differences in processing for choices in these contexts. The authors were interested
in testing the generalizability of expectation-type calculations in different domains. Specifically,
they hypothesized that the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying choice do not generalize
across domains. The researchers found that the affect-rich and affect-poor choices recruited
qualitatively different brain circuits. The amygdala was more strongly activated in affect-rich
choice than affect-poor choice, suggesting greater engagement of affective processing of
outcomes. In contrast, areas associated with executive function and calculative processes, such as
the supramarginal gyrus and the superior lateral occipital cortex, were more active in affect-poor
choice. Furthermore, there was greater activation in brain regions associated with processing
probability, for example the supramarginal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus, in affect-poor
choice than affect-rich. Overall, Suter and colleagues’ (2015) results suggest that probabilities
are utilized to a lesser degree in affect-rich choice, wherein the primary activation occurs in
regions concerned with the emotional value of outcomes. Conversely, fMRI activation
demonstrated that individuals appear more likely to utilize the available probability information
in their decision making when making choices in the affect-poor context.
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In the present research, we examine potential causes for the differences in choice for
affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes, including the potential that they may be due to probability
insensitivity in the presence of affect. If this is the primary driver of differences across contexts,
we will attempt to correct this insensitivity by helping individuals appreciate probability
information.
Effectively Communicating Probability
Understanding probability can be a challenging task for a wide range of individuals and it
has been suggested that probability is the most difficult aspect of risk to communicate and
comprehend (e.g., Bogardus, Holmboe, & Jekel, 1999). Depicting probabilities is not always
straightforward, and the potential for misinterpretation and miscommunication about likelihoods
can arise even when dealing with risks that individuals may encounter in routine daily life, such
as those relating to medical treatments.
Displaying likelihoods visually is one method that has been shown to improve risk
comprehension (Lipkus, 2007; Waters, Weinstein, Colditz, & Emmons, 2007; Zikmund-Fisher,
Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2008). Visual displays are most effective when they are made transparent
through elements that are well-defined, accurate, and not misleading; for example, by making
part-to-whole relationships available explicitly. By improving risk comprehension, visual aids
can offer many benefits such as increasing risk avoidance when appropriate (Schirillo & Stone,
2005), and encouraging healthy behaviors like vaccination (Cox, Cox, Sturm, & Zimet, 2010).
There are many options for displaying risk information visually, such as the use of bar
graphs, pie charts, or risk ladders. However, research has repeatedly demonstrated that the use of
icon arrays (also referred to as pictographs or pictograms) are a particularly beneficial
supplemental tool for communicating probability information (Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, &
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Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Waters et al., 2007). Icon
arrays utilize a matrix of small images (i.e., icons), often in groups of 100 or 1,000, to show
likelihoods of one or more events, such as experiencing a side effect with medication. For
example, Figure 3 presents a 10x10 array in which the likelihood of experiencing a side effect
from medication, 30%, is displayed as the circles with Xs marked in them. Research has
suggested that icon arrays are particularly beneficial for communicating risk statistics because
they utilize frequency information by showing the number of individuals that are affected given a
sample of specified size (Waters et al., 2007). Several studies have shown that frequencies tend
to be much easier to process and understand than more abstract values such as probabilities or
odds ratios (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Schapira, Nattinger, &
McHorney,). In addition, icon arrays make differences between those affected and not affected
more apparent than other visual formats such as bar graphs (Waters et al., 2007).

Figure 3. Example icon array displaying a 30% probability of outcome occurrence.

Research has demonstrated that icon arrays assist in comprehension of numerical risks
(Hawley et al., 2008) and improve accuracy (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic,
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2010; Waters et al., 2007). For example, Waters and colleagues (2007) showed that, compared
with presenting information as numbers only, adding an icon array substantially reduced side
effect aversion, which is the tendency to avoid a beneficial or needed treatment because of the
presence of a side effect. In other words, using the icon array increased the willingness to
undergo the beneficial treatment despite the minor increase in a chance of experiencing a side
effect associated with taking a medication. Furthermore, adding an icon array improved
individuals’ accuracy in indicating that the treatment would result in a reduction in total risk of
cancer compared to the numbers only condition, and increased the participants’ ability to
evaluate a trade-off of the risks and benefits of the treatment.
Research has demonstrated that individuals who struggle with numerical concepts such as
risk may be especially helped by the use of icon arrays. The ability to comprehend and utilize
numeric information is referred to as one’s level of numeracy (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001).
There are wide variations in numeracy (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) and having adequate
levels of numeracy is critical for understanding risk, especially when outcomes pertain to health
(Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007). For example, Pachur and Galesic (2012) found
that numeracy level impacted one’s ability to select the normatively better option (option with
higher EV) when deciding between affect-rich medical side effects and affect-poor monetary
lottery pairs. They found the general tendency for individuals high in numeracy to more often
selected the lottery with the higher EV, compared to those low in numeracy.
Hawley and colleagues (2008) explored how individuals varying in numeracy are aided
by the use of icon arrays. They found that icon arrays lead to some of the highest levels of
knowledge about exact numerical information, such as the number of people affected by a
treatment, referred to as verbatim knowledge. The icon arrays also helped individuals answer
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questions on general information about which treatment is better, known as gist knowledge.
Using icon arrays was therefore recommended as the best format for communicating both types
of information. Furthermore, the arrays remained the recommended format for both those high
and low in numeracy, as the use of icon arrays leads to high levels of correct answers for
verbatim and gist knowledge questions regardless of level of numeracy.
Galesic and colleagues (2009) found that, especially for individuals low in numeracy, the
addition of icon arrays to numerical statements was beneficial for understanding medical risks,
such as reducing the risk of stroke or heart attack. Furthermore, Garcia-Retamero and Galesic
(2010) found that, among individuals with high graph literacy, the use of icon arrays could
improve the level of risk understanding among low numeracy individuals to comparable levels
observed in those with higher numeracy. Icon arrays may be especially advantageous for low
numeracy individuals because the arrays are able to visually display percentages as frequencies,
which are discrete units that effectively communicate part-to-whole relationships (Ancker et al.,
2006).
However, there may be differences in how individuals high and low in numeracy process
icon arrays. For example, Hess and colleagues (2011) found that those with high numeracy tend
to count the number of affected icons displayed in the array. Comparatively, those who have low
numeracy are presumed to perceive the graph in a more holistic sense. In fact, Hess and
colleagues (2011) found that prompting low numeracy individuals to count the icons can be
rather confusing for this group. Thus it appears that while icon arrays are helpful for both high
and low numeracy individuals, the reasons behind the helpfulness may be different for each
group.

15
In Study 1 of the proposed research, our goal is to test whether the differences in affectrich and affect-poor choice found by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et
al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) are primarily due to probability insensitivity in the
presence of affect, and if so, to correct this insensitivity by highlighting and illustrating the
relevant probability information. As icon arrays have been suggested as a particularly helpful
format for a wide range of individuals, including those who struggle with numerical skills, we
will utilize supplemental icon arrays as an alternative to numeric probabilities alone. The
proposed research will also explore whether the addition of icon arrays can be particularly
helpful for those low in numeracy when information is presented in both an affect-rich and
affect-poor context.
Comparability of Outcomes
To make comparisons across affective contexts, Pachur and colleagues assumed that
eliciting monetary equivalents utilizing a WTP paradigm would produce an affect-poor value
that was comparable in every way to the affect-rich side effects, except that the monetary
equivalents have less affect associated with them. However, there is concern about whether the
affect-poor “equivalents” elicited by this paradigm are in fact that. Monetary amounts may differ
from affect-rich outcomes in more ways than affect alone. These differences include issues such
as comparability and precision of outcomes.
Though Pachur and colleagues attribute their findings of discounting probability
information to the presence of affect, their results may be due instead to difficulties associated
with comparing outcomes that have different attributes from one another. The different side
effects to be compared may involve qualitatively different visceral feelings, which could make
these options difficult to compare. For instance, the feelings that are associated with
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experiencing a fever are not likely to be the same as those associated with suffering from
memory loss. The side effect of fever may be comprised of attributes on several different
dimensions such as chills, weakness, or sweating, whereas memory loss may involve attributes
on different dimensions such as confusion, forgetfulness, or challenges in planning. In contrast,
the affect-poor outcomes involving money all exist on the same continuum of dollar values.
Because different side effects are comprised of different sets of attributes, they cannot
typically be compared on the same scale(s). Options with noncomparable attributes (Johnson,
1984), or nonalignable differences (Zhang & Markman, 2001) are more difficult to compare than
those with shared attributes wherein differences occur on the same scale.
Johnson (1984) investigated the strategies behind choices for noncomparable versus
comparable outcomes. When outcomes are comparable, people can simply utilize a withinattribute strategy, comparing alternatives on shared attributes. However, this is not possible when
the attributes of the outcomes are not the same. For example, when comparing a television to a
stereo, it is hard to say which is better or worse as they don’t share attributes such as screen size,
picture quality, and internet capability. One strategy for dealing with these incompatibilities
involves making decisions at the level of overall evaluations. Thus, the evaluations of the
individual option attributes of screen size, picture quality, sound quality, etc., may be summed to
create an overall evaluation of worth for the television. This could be compared to the
summation of the attributes volume, sound quality, and size for the stereo. Developing this
overall evaluation based on pooling across attributes is relatively effortful, and is typically not
the preferred strategy.
A more popular strategy is to compare within attributes, but this is not straightforward
when the options involve noncomparable alternatives. In this case, abstraction is required to
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create attributes that are representative of all options in a decision set. For example, if comparing
a television and a stereo, the attribute “frequency of use” may be used for comparison. These
higher level abstractions are not necessary when comparing options that share the same
attributes, especially when option values are on a single dimension (e.g., dollars).
Because people prefer within-attribute strategies, Johnson (1984) suggested that when
outcomes are noncomparable, people seek out ways to compare the outcomes through higher
levels of abstraction. As the level of abstraction increases for each attribute, the attribute
becomes more common to an increasing number of alternatives, which facilitates comparisons.
However, Johnson (1984) suggested that there is a point at which the effort to abstract to a
sufficient level in a within-attribute strategy becomes greater than the effort required to compare
alternatives in an across-attribute strategy. Therefore, he predicted that as alternatives increase in
noncomparability, the typically easier within-attribute decision strategy would be abandoned,
and they would shift instead to the less desirable across-attribute strategy.
To examine these hypotheses individuals were asked to make comparisons between
options that were judged to be comparable (e.g., two televisions), moderately noncomparable
(e.g., a television and a stereo), or more noncomparable (e.g., a television and an automobile).
Individuals were asked to make a decision between the two alternatives. They were instructed to
think about how the decision between the two options was to be made, with specific instructions
to think aloud about the attributes or criteria used in making the decision. Attributes mentioned
were then coded for whether a comparison was made on that attribute or whether it was used just
as a descriptor of an alternative. Attributes were also rated on a 0-10 point concreteness to
abstractness scale.
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As predicted, results demonstrated that as the options in a pair became more
noncomparable, the level of abstractness of the attributes describing the options increased. For
example, one of the most common attributes for moderately noncomparable options was “use,”
whereas for more noncomparable options “necessity” and “importance” were the most common.
Additionally, individuals generally retained a within-attribute decision strategy; however,
gradually shifted to an across-attribute decision strategy as alternatives become more
noncomparable.
Because the affect-rich side effects involve many noncomparable attributes, choices
between different side effects may require higher levels of abstraction than choices between
different amounts of money. In a follow-up paper, Johnson (1986), noted that abstracting is
likely to become a more effortful process as the number of abstracted attributes increases.
Therefore, additional cognitive effort may be needed to abstract and make comparisons between
the side effects. As Johnson (1986) notes, comparisons on price do not require this kind of
abstraction.
In related work, Zhang and Markman (2001) have found that decision making between
options is more difficult when options have fewer commonalities, or alignable differences, and
more nonalignable differences. Alignable differences are those in which items have
corresponding elements with different values on the same dimension. Comparatively, a
nonalignable difference is one in which an aspect of one item does not have a corresponding
element in the other item. Zhang and Markman (2001) introduce the example of a comparison
between two brands of popcorn. Popcorn A is covered in butter, pops in a bag, and contains citric
acid. Popcorn B is covered in butter, pops in a bowl, and does not contain citric acid. In this
example, an alignable difference is the method for popping the popcorn: either in a bag or in a
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bowl. It is an alignable difference because both types of popcorn share the property of how the
popcorn is popped; however, the aspects of this property (the bag or bowl) are different. A
nonalignable difference is the presence of citric acid, as this creates an element that is present in
one type of popcorn, but not the other.
Zhang and Markman’s (2001) research supports the idea that when making a decision
between Popcorn A and B, individuals are more likely to utilize the information pertaining to the
alignable difference of how the popcorn is popped (e.g., in a bag or in a bowl), than the
nonalignable difference of whether or not citric acid is an ingredient. Compared with alignable
differences, nonalignable differences require more processing effort because they are difficult to
incorporate into the comparison. Additionally, nonalignable differences are harder to utilize
when making tradeoffs between options because there is less shared information for making
comparisons. Similar to noncomparable alternatives, making comparisons between options with
nonalignable differences is difficult because the attributes that make up an option are unique to
that option and cannot be adequately compared with the unique attributes of another option.
The difficulties associated with noncomparable and nonalignable differences serve as a
potential alternative explanation of the results of Pachur and colleagues. Unlike money, different
side effects have different attributes, which makes them harder to compare. This difficulty, and
not the proposed insensitivity to probability in the presence of affect, may explain why people
tend to have trouble selecting the option with the higher expected value. Regardless of whether
affect is involved, the presence of noncomparable attributes may make comparing side effects
more difficult than comparing monetary amounts.
In Study 2 of the proposed research, we address the potential problem associated with
noncomparable outcomes by creating a set of side effect outcomes wherein all differences are
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alignable. Instead of comparing different side effects in each choice, individuals will make
comparisons between the same side effects with varying degrees of severity (e.g., comparing
some chance of slight insomnia to some chance of moderate insomnia). This will allow for
choice between outcomes to be on the same scale, and thus high in comparability as options
share the same set of attributes. Thus, in this manipulation of affect-rich side effects, we will test
whether differences between affect-rich and affect-poor contexts remain even after eliminating
the possibility that differences in choice might be due to differences in the comparability of
outcomes or alignability of attributes. If affect itself influences choice, differences in preferences
between the affect-rich and affect-poor conditions should remain. If instead, preference
differences were caused by differences in comparability rather than affect, then the preference
differences should be reduced or disappear.
Precision of Outcomes
Another feature of outcomes that differs in the affect-rich and affect-poor conditions in
the work of Pachur and colleagues involves the precision of outcomes. In their affect-poor lottery
task, individuals make decisions between possible monetary outcomes, which not only allow for
comparison on the same scale with the same attributes, but also provides a precise quantitative
representation. In contrast, the affect-rich medical side effects lack the same precision and
quantitative representation.
Much of the difference in precision derives from the fact that the affect-poor outcomes
are numerical whereas the affect-rich outcomes are conceptual and non-numerical. As noted by
McGraw, Shafir, and Todorov (2010), the use of non-numerical outcomes may impair one’s
ability to easily integrate outcomes and probabilities into a summary evaluation. This type of
integration is required for calculating EV, which is the criterion used in the Pachur, et al., task to
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evaluate the quality of choice performance. It may be that performance was found to be superior
in the affect-poor monetary conditions simply because calculation of EV is more straightforward
when combining two exact numbers: a probability and a dollar amount. Calculating EV is likely
to be more difficult when combining a probability with a non-numeric concept of a side effect.
Therefore, the original findings, which Pachur and colleagues attribute to affect, could be due
instead to difficulty combining outcomes and probabilities to determine worth in affect-rich
choice.
This possibility is supported by McGraw, Shafir, and Todorov (2010) who found that the
psychological valuation of monetary (i.e., numeric) and nonmonetary (i.e., non-numeric, for
example, washing dishes) outcomes is distinct. Their research demonstrated that when making
decisions about monetary outcomes, the expected tendency to determine worth through a
combination of outcome and probability values holds. However, when making decisions about
nonmonetary outcomes, individuals do not intuitively assign a monetary value to the outcome,
which would hinder utilization of a strategy that combines probability and outcome values to
determine worth. The absence of a numeric outcome resulted in decreased sensitivity to
probability for the choices involving nonmonetary outcomes presumably because it was not
possible to combine the numeric probability information with the nonnumeric outcome
information. Further, as a result of the decreased sensitivity to probability, individuals were
likely to hold different preferences for monetary and nonmonetary outcomes when the
probability of those outcomes was low versus high. In line with previous findings by
Rottenstreich & Hsee (2001), McGraw and colleagues (2010) found that individuals show a
greater aversion to the nonmonetary (versus monetary) outcomes when they have a low
probability of occurrence (1% chance), but show a greater aversion to the monetary (versus
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nonmonetary) outcomes when they have a high probability of occurrence (99% chance). If
preferences were stable and sensitive to probability, you would expect that the outcome that is
preferred at 1% likelihood would also be preferred at 99% likelihood; however, this was not the
case. This pattern of preferences and decreased sensitivity to probability, which has previously
been attributed to affect-richness (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), remained despite the monetary
outcomes being regarded as more affect-rich than the nonmonetary outcomes. Therefore, rather
than the presence of affect, a potential explanation for the differences found by Pachur and
colleagues may be a discrepancy in how individuals calculate worth of monetary and
nonmonetary outcomes in choice, and how this discrepancy enables or inhibits use of probability
information.
To counter this argument, Suter, Pachur, and Hertwig (2015) revised the original
methodology used by Pachur and colleagues (2014) in an attempt to show that the addition of
numeric values to the affect-rich outcomes would not eliminate the differences in ability to
choose the higher EV lotteries in the affect-rich versus affect-poor context. Half of participants
viewed the side effects displayed along with the respective WTP values that they provided
earlier, whereas the other half saw only the side effect with no supplemental WTP value. The
researchers found that including the respective WTP values with the affect-rich lotteries did not
influence the proportion of choices of the higher EV lottery. Participants continued to more often
choose the option with the higher EV in the affect-poor than affect-rich lotteries, which
replicated the findings of Pachur and Galesic (2012) and Pachur and colleagues (2014). With
these results, the authors concluded that the differences between the affect-rich and affect-poor
choice were not due to the presence of numerical vs. non-numerical information. However,
simply adding a relatively abstract numeric value to the affect-rich side effects (e.g., a monetary
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amount paired with a side effect) may not adequately address the problem if the side effects are
fundamentally hard to compare and also less precise than the affect-poor monetary outcomes.
Monetary outcomes are highly precise, with a clearcut meaning associated with different
values. Side effects are much less precise in their meaning, as are most constructs communicated
in normal everyday language. According to fuzzy set theory, most language constructs function
to categorize our world and these categories typically have fuzzy membership gradations
(Smithson & Oden, 1999). For example, when describing the color blue, there is wide variation
in what one would classify as blue. Baby blue, navy, and turquoise could all be classified as
belonging to the category of blue; however if you asked your friends to describe the color blue,
without further specifications, you are likely to elicit different responses. This type of fuzzy
membership is the norm in language. For example, a concept as simple as a cup has a wide range
in which characteristics can vary without compromising the applicability of the term (e.g., it
could be tall or short, wide or narrow, and with or without a handle).
More abstract concepts such as probability terms are also fuzzy and are subject to
interpretation. For example, Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth (1986) found that
there is wide variability in the numeric probabilistic value placed on nonnumeric probability
terms such as probable, likely, and possible. The researchers found that even the term toss up,
which can be thought of as a coin toss (with 50% probability of each outcome), leads to
probability estimates ranging between 40% and 60%. Abstract feelings like those associated with
side effects are likely to be fuzzy as well, perhaps even more so than the examples provided
above.
The fact that concepts such as side effects are more vague whereas monetary values are
precise, may influence choices. Research has demonstrated that individuals differentially value
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and utilize vague information in choice. For example, Kuhn, Budescu, Hershey, Kramer, &
Rantilla (1999) found that preferences vary for vague versus precise information. Using a
gambling task, they found a general tendency for vagueness aversion in outcomes, where
individuals preferred options when outcomes were presented in more precise terms. This
demonstrated that outcome vagueness is important in preferences between options, and this was
particularly true when outcomes were in the negative domain. In the context of deciding between
side effects and monetary outcomes, preferences may differ simply because of a lack of precision
that is inherent to the side effects.
Thus, it is possible that the differences in precision between the affect-rich and affectpoor stimuli are contributing to the alternative patterns of choice seen in each context. For
example, the enhanced precision available in the affect-poor choice may aid the EV calculation
used in these decisions. Comparatively, the lack of precision inherent in the affect-rich constructs
of side effects may complicate or add noise to the EV calculation of the outcomes incorporated
in choice.
We will address this concern in Study 3 of the proposed research by making our affectpoor monetary outcomes less precise, while adding a numeric scale to the affect-rich side effects.
If side effects are inherently vague constructs, providing a single numeric value to a side effect
outcome may not adequately capture the meaning communicated by the construct. Therefore, for
the affect-rich context, we will add a numerical range of side effect intensity. To better align the
precision of the outcomes in the affect-rich and affect-poor contexts, we chose to introduce a
similar lack of precision into the affect-poor condition by replacing specific monetary values
with ranges of monetary values. In both cases, the outcomes will have both numeric and

25
language labels to further match the conditions in the event that the presence of numbers is
required to gauge the EV of options.
Present Research
In a series of three studies, we sought to challenge and expand on the work of Pachur and
Galesic (2012), Pachur and colleagues (2014) and Suter, Pachur, and Hertwig (2015). Our
primary goal was to explore potential explanations for the affect gap found in choices for affectrich and affect-poor outcomes. We did this by examining how probability display as well as
outcome comparability and precision influence choice in affect-rich and affect-poor contexts.
In Study 1, we sought to replicate and extend the results of Pachur and colleagues
(Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) by exploring a
remedy for the affect gap through increasing sensitivity to probability via a visual representation
of likelihoods. In addition to the numeric probability conditions, we included conditions with
icon arrays to visually represent, and make salient, probability information in both the affect-rich
and affect-poor contexts.
In Study 2, we explored the potential for differences in nonalignability of outcomes to be
a substantial contributor to the differences in choice between affect-rich and affect-poor
outcomes. In this study, we brought the affect-rich side effects into alignment by using outcomes
in each choice that represent different levels of severity on the same side effect continuum (e.g.,
20% chance of a slight insomnia versus 10% chance of a moderate insomnia). We investigated
whether the established pattern of choice for affect-rich versus affect-poor prospects remains.
In Study 3, we evaluated whether the lack of precision that exists in the affect-rich
outcomes could be contributing to the differences in choice between contexts found by Pachur
and colleagues. In this study, we explored how decisions are made when the precise information
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about an outcome is not available, as is typically the case when dealing with affective constructs.
To do this, we used outcomes represented as belonging to a category with a range of values. We
continued to employ the use of comparisons of the same alignable side effects varying in severity
that were created for Study 2. However, in Study 3, the affect-poor values were represented as a
range of monetary values and described in natural language terms (e.g. $15-$29 representing a
“small” amount of money). The use of a range of numeric values was meant to create a similar
lack of precision in both the affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes, allowing for comparisons of
outcomes that are more equivalent with regard to level of precision. Because the monetary
categories still included numeric values, we matched this in the affect-rich condition using range
values for each named category from a commonly-used numbered discomfort intensity scale
(e.g., intensity 1-3 representing a “slight” fever).
Though the present research is described as three separate studies, the research was
conducted concurrently as one large randomly counterbalanced study. Assignment to Study 1, 2,
or 3, was counterbalanced across study sessions. We conducted the research in this manner to
allow for comparisons to be made across all conditions, regardless of whether it was labeled as
Study 1, 2, or 3. Through an exploration of probability presentation methods and comparability
of outcomes, this research advanced our understanding of potential influences on choice
behavior in scenarios more and less rich with affect.
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STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to replicate and expand on the work of Pachur and
colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) by
increasing sensitivity to probability information. In this study, we manipulated the representation
of likelihoods in affect-rich and affect-poor contexts by comparing choices when probability is
displayed as a numeric probability only versus a numeric probability that is also depicted
visually within an icon array. Based on previous findings (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero
& Galesic, 2010; Waters et al., 2007), we expected that the presence of the icon array would
bring increased attention to probability, and help clarify how the probabilities in the two options
compare to one another.
The specific hypotheses were as follows:
S1-H1: Because icon arrays are expected to help individuals pay attention to and utilize
probability information, we expected a greater proportion of choices for the higher EV lottery
when the icon array is available than when it was not.
S1-H2: Based on Pachur and colleagues’ previous findings, individuals were predicted to choose
the higher EV lottery more often in the affect-poor than the affect-rich context.
S1-H3a: If differences in choice were due predominantly to probability insensitivity in the
presence of affect, we expected there would be a greater increase in the proportion of higher EV
lottery choices with the addition of an icon array in the affect-rich context than in the affect-poor
context. That is, the addition of the icon array would be especially helpful in the affect-rich
context.
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S1-H3b: If the differences in choice were due predominantly to characteristics of outcomes, we
expected a greater increase in the proportion of choice for the higher EV lottery with the addition
of an icon array in the affect-poor context than in the affect-rich. That is, the addition of the icon
array would be especially helpful in the affect-poor context, where outcomes are more easily
compared to one another and integrated with probability information.
S1-H4: As was found previously in Pachur and Galesic (2012), we expected to see a main effect
of Numeracy. We predicted that individuals high in numeracy will make a greater proportion of
choices for the higher EV lottery than those low in numeracy.
S1-H5: Although individuals high in numeracy were expected to choose a greater proportion of
higher EV lotteries than those low in numeracy in both the numeric and the icon array
conditions, individuals low in numeracy were expected to get a larger boost in performance with
the addition of the icon array, so that differences in advantageous choice between those high and
low in numeracy would be smaller in the icon array condition than in the numeric condition.
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Method
Participants
One hundred thirty-one participants enrolled in a psychology course at a large urban
university were recruited to participate in the study through an online system. They were
compensated with extra credit in a psychology course of their choosing. Based on a power
analysis, in order to be in a position to find a medium effect size with power = .80 and alpha =
.05 when comparing four independent groups, we needed 114 participants. After eliminations,
we were left with 117 participants for analysis. Fourteen participants were eliminated from the
data set. As not to include participants with more than 20% tied/missing data for our primary
lottery task, we eliminated individuals if their total number of trials in each affective context fell
below 15 (out of a possible 18 trials). This included eliminations for cases in which the higher
EV lottery could not be determined (following Pachur, personal communication, December 18,
2017). This may have occurred in certain instances because individuals provided their own WTP
values, and when these values were combined with the probability for each lottery in a trial, tied
EV for both lotteries in a pair may have resulted. Seven participants were eliminated for having
greater than 20% of tied EV lotteries/missing data in the primary lottery task.
An additional three participants were eliminated for not following the instructions in the
willingness-to-pay task (as described in the procedure), and four were eliminated for failing the
affective evaluation manipulation check (i.e., indicating the same affective value for each side
effect).
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Design
We utilized a 2x2 Probability Display x Affective Context mixed design. Probability
Display was a between-subjects manipulation of the probability display with two levels: numeric
or icon array (+array). Affective Context was a within-subjects variable representing the affectrich side effects versus the affect-poor monetary outcomes.
To capture how individuals make choices between risky options, the primary dependent
variable was the proportion of choices of the higher expected value lottery out of 18 lottery pairs.
Expected value for each gamble was computed by summing the product of the probability and
outcome monetary equivalent generated in the WTP task. To document that our affect-rich
outcomes were more affect-rich than the affect-poor outcomes, we measured the intensity of
affect generated by the thought of experiencing each possible outcome (side effect or equivalent
monetary loss) on a scale of 1 = not at all upset to 10 = very upset. Consistent with the work of
Pachur and colleagues (2014), participants rated the amount of affect they would feel if having to
experience a given side effect in the affect-rich domain, and rated their level of affect if required
to pay a specified amount of money after losing a bet in the affect-poor domain.
Numeracy was measured with the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale (Weller et al., 2013). The
ANS examines objective levels of numerical ability through assessment of numerical concepts
such as risk and probability. The ANS is rather new; however, it was created by combining items
used in previous numeracy measures (Frederick, 2005; Lipkus et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2007;
Schwartz, Wolshin, Black, & Welch, 1997). The scale has demonstrated sufficient reliability and
validity (Cronbach’s α = .71; Weller et al., 2013), and results in scores that are more normally
distributed than other available numeracy assessments (e.g., Weller et al., 2013).
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Stimuli
Affect-rich and affect-poor stimuli were used in the lottery task. A total of 12 side effects
borrowed from Pachur and colleagues (2014) and displayed in Table 1, were used to create the
affect-rich stimuli. The affect-poor stimuli were created independently for each participant at the
time of the study through a WTP task, which is described in detail in the procedure. Table 1
presents the median WTP values gathered by Pachur and colleagues (2014) as well as median
values we collected from 135 USF psychology undergraduates in a pilot study used to build the
stimuli. As can be seen, in most cases, the values are quite similar across studies.
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Table 1.
Twelve Side Effects and Corresponding Median WTP Values from Pachur et al. (2014) as Well
as Median WTP Values for a Pilot Study of 135 USF Psychology Undergraduates

The affect-rich side effects and each participant’s generated WTP values for the
corresponding affect-poor outcomes were each paired with probabilities and incorporated into
lottery pairs. These lottery pairs were the stimuli presented in each trial of the numeric or +array
condition. We utilized all 13 lottery pairs from Pachur and colleagues (2014), with a minor
adjustment to one lottery, wherein the probability was adjusted from 0.5% to 1% to effectively
display the value in the icon array. An additional 5 lotteries were created and included in
anticipation of needs in Studies 2 and 3. The lotteries are similar to the range of probabilities,
EV, and EV differences as the original 13. The complete set of lotteries is displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2.
Set of 18 Affect-rich Lottery Pairs (Showing Only Non-Zero Outcomes) to be Used in Study 1

Each lottery pair involves two lotteries depicting a non-zero outcome with some
probability, otherwise nothing. Figure 4 displays an example of how the affect-rich numeric
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lottery pair appeared. As can be seen, the lottery on the left, Medication A, displays a 20%
chance of experiencing insomnia, otherwise no side effect, and the lottery on the right,
Medication B, displays a 10% chance of experiencing memory loss, otherwise no side effect.

Figure 4. Example affect-rich numeric lottery pair.

The same lottery pairs were used in the affect-rich numeric and +array conditions;
however, for options in +array lottery pairs, an icon array was also included to visually represent
the likelihood of experiencing the medication side effect. Figure 5 provides an example. Each
icon array involves a 10 x 10 formation of 100 circles with X’s in a subset of circles to represent
the chance of experiencing each medication’s side effect. As indicated in the written description
above the array in the example here, the left panel displays a 20% chance of insomnia, otherwise
no side effect, and the right panel displays a 10% chance of memory loss, otherwise no side
effect.
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Figure 5. Example affect-rich +array lottery pair.

Each lottery pair displayed in the affect-rich context also had a corresponding lottery pair
in the affect-poor context, constructed with the individually-obtained WTP values substituted in
for side effects. For example, as is displayed in Figure 6, insomnia has been replaced by an
example WTP value of $25, yielding a lottery with 20% chance of losing $25, otherwise nothing.
Additionally, memory loss has been replaced by an example WTP value of $50, yielding a 10%
chance of losing $50, otherwise nothing.

Figure 6. Example affect-poor numeric lottery pair.
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The same affect-poor lottery pair is represented in the +array condition below in Figure 7.
This example displays the same lottery as in Figure 6 along with its corresponding icon array
highlighting the probability to lose the specified amount of money in each lottery.

Figure 7. Example affect-poor +array lottery pair.

Procedure
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given free choice in seating at one of 11
computer stations. Consent to participate and task instructions were displayed on the computer.
Each individual experienced both an affect-rich and an affect-poor context in a randomly
determined order with either the numeric or +array condition of probability display as randomly
assigned.
Participants first completed a WTP task. In this task, participants indicated their WTP
values for avoiding each of the 12 side effects if each were guaranteed to occur with 100%
certainty. In a modified version of the instructions from Pachur and colleagues (2014),
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participants were told, “Imagine you have an illness and need to take a medication for 1 week.
Two equally effective medications are available to treat the illness. Medication A has a side
effect, which is guaranteed to occur, and Medication B has no side effects. For each side effect
listed below, please indicate how much extra you would pay for a 1-week supply of the package
of the medication with no side effects.” For each of the 12 side effects, presented in a random
order, participants indicated the amount, in dollars, that they would be willing to pay extra to
acquire the package of medication with no side effects. These WTP values were used as a
replacement of the side effect outcome values in the associated affect-poor lotteries.
Next, participants completed the lottery task that contains two parts: one affect-rich and
one affect-poor. The order of viewing the affect-rich and affect-poor lottery task was
counterbalanced across participants. In the affect-rich condition, participants were told that they
have an unspecified illness that will last 1 week and must choose one of two equally effective
medications to treat the illness. They were instructed to choose between two lotteries described
as Medication A versus Medication B, each of which presents a potential side effect that could
occur with a specified probability, otherwise no side effect. (See Figure 4 for a numeric example
and Figure 5 for a +array example.) Participants selected which medication they would prefer of
the two options in the pair. Participants experienced a total of 18 affect-rich lottery pairs in a
random order in the probability display condition that they are assigned.
In the affect-poor lottery problems, participants viewed the 18 randomly ordered lottery
pairs with the same probabilities that were seen in the affect-rich task; however, the side effects
were replaced by the individual’s WTP amounts gathered at the outset of the study. Participants
were told to imagine that they were in a situation in which they must choose between different
lotteries that involve potential losses. They were instructed to choose between two lotteries
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described as Lottery A versus Lottery B, each of which presented a potential monetary loss that
could occur with a specified probability, otherwise nothing (see Figure 6 for a numeric example
and Figure 7 for a +array example). Participants selected which lottery they preferred from the
two options in the pair.
After completion of both parts of the lottery task, participants completed the affective
evaluation task, which served as a manipulation check. In this task, participants rated the affect
associated with each outcome that was viewed in the affect-rich and affect-poor lottery task.
Affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes were presented in a random order within each context, and
the order in which each context was presented was counterbalanced across participants. For the
affect-rich affective evaluations, participants were told to imagine that they must take a
medication for treatment of an illness and this medication has a side effect that will be
experienced with certainty. Participants viewed the 12 side effects used in the lottery task in a
randomized order, and, for each, rated how upset they would be to experience the side effect. For
the affect-poor affective evaluations, participants were presented with each WTP amount they
indicated previously and told that they were to imagine they had lost a bet and must pay that
specified amount of money. The WTP values were presented in a random order and the
participant indicated how upset they would be if s/he must pay this amount.
The affective evaluation task was followed by the objective numeracy scale. Participants
were then thanked for their participation and dismissed from the laboratory.
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Results
In what follows, we assessed whether the presence of the affect gap was likely due to
probability insensitivity. Our first analysis was a manipulation check, testing whether the affectrich outcomes derived a greater amount of negative affect than the affect-poor outcomes. The
primary analysis tested whether increasing sensitivity to probability information in our lottery
task through the use of an icon array reduced or eliminated the affect gap. In this analysis we
also assessed the potential moderating influence of numeracy.
Monetary and Affective Evaluation
A manipulation check was first conducted to ensure that our affect-rich stimuli generated
greater negative affect than our affect-poor stimuli. The mean affect ratings are shown for each
affect-rich side effect and its affect-poor monetary equivalent in Table 3. We utilized a repeated
measures MANOVA to analyze the affect ratings for the 12 affect-rich side effects and the
matched affect-poor monetary values. We found a significant main effect of affective context,
F(12, 96)= 6.76, p< .001, 𝑛!! = .46, confirming that our affect-rich outcomes (M= 6.37, SD=
1.09) were rated as generating significantly more negative affect on average than the affect-poor
monetary equivalents (M= 5.59, SD= 1.49). Follow-up univariate analyses indicated that each of
the 12 affect-rich side effects elicited a significantly greater amount of negative affect than its
affect-poor monetary equivalent.
Also displayed in Table 3 are the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile responses for the monetary
evaluation task to demonstrate the variability in the WTP values. The WTP values were similar
to those obtained previously by Pachur and colleagues (2014) and in our pilot study.
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Table 3.
Willingness-To-Pay Percentile Values for the Affect-Rich Outcomes, and Mean and Standard
Deviations of Affective Ratings for the Affect-Rich Outcomes and Their Affect-Poor Monetary
Equivalents

Note. CI = confidence interval. The 95% CIs refer to the difference between the average affect
rating for the affect-rich side effects and the average affect rating for the affect-poor willingnessto-pay values. Ratings for the affective evaluation ranged from 1 (not upset) to 10 (very upset).
Lottery Task
To assess the hypotheses, a 2x2x2 Probability Display x Numeracy x Affective Context
mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results are displayed in Figure 8. The dependent measure
for this analysis was the proportion of choices of the higher EV lottery. As described previously,
participants were eliminated if having EV ties or missing data for more than three lottery pairs in
each affective context. Therefore, the percentage of higher EV choices was computed for each
participant out of a possible 15 to 18 total choices in each affective context.
Due to computer error, one question on the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale could not be
included in analysis (i.e., “If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the
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same as having a _____% chance of getting the disease”). The reliability of this measure without
this item was α= .64, indicating adequate reliability. A median split was used to classify groups
into low numeracy (i.e., scores of 0-3; N=58) and high numeracy (i.e., scores of 4-7; N=59) for
analysis.
Replicating the results of Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al.,
2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015), there was a significant main effect of affective context,
F(1, 113)= 24.81, p< .001, 𝑛!! = .18, displayed in Figure 8. In support of Hypothesis S1-H2,
individuals chose a greater proportion of higher EV lotteries when in the affect-poor (M=
78.39%, SD= 14.23%) compared to the affect-rich (M= 68.96%, SD= 14.22%) condition.
Replicating the results of Pachur and Galesic (2012), the main effect of numeracy was
also significant, F(1, 113)= 4.39, p= .04, 𝑛!! = .04, though the effect size was small. As can be
seen in Figure 8, individuals high in numeracy had a slightly stronger tendency to choose higher
EV lotteries (M= 75.56%, SD= 9.99%) than those low in numeracy (M= 71.75%, SD= 9.90%),
though both groups showed relatively high levels compared to previous research (e.g., 64% and
59% for those high and low in numeracy, respectively; Pachur & Galesic, 2012). This finding
supported Hypothesis S1-H4. To corroborate the results, we ran correlations between numeracy
and choice of the higher EV lottery in both affective contexts. Higher numeracy was weakly
associated with better choice in the affect-poor context, r(117)=.19, p= .04, however, there was
no discernible relationship between numeracy and choice in the affect-rich context, r(117)=.08,
ns.
We did not find a significant main effect of probability display, F(1, 113) < 1, failing to
support Hypothesis S1-H1. There was no support for differences in the proportion of choices for
the higher EV lottery for those viewing the numeric versus the +array conditions, suggesting that
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the icon array was not particularly beneficial for choice. Further, contrary to Hypotheses S1-H3a
and S1-H3b, we found no significant interaction between probability display and affective
context, F(1, 113) < 1. Therefore, the addition of the icon array did not have a noticeable effect
in either the affect-rich or the affect-poor condition. This suggests that individuals performed just
as well without the array as when it was present. Given that performance was high, it casts doubt
on the idea that probability insensitivity is leading to differences in affect-rich and affect-poor
choice.
As research has demonstrated that individuals low in numeracy are especially aided by
the presence of an icon array (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010), we
predicted they would receive a larger boost in performance with the array present than those high
in numeracy. However, we found no evidence of a Probability Display x Numeracy interaction,
F(1, 113) = 1.72, ns, yielding no support for Hypothesis S1-H5. Furthermore, the Numeracy x
Affective Context interaction was not significant, F(1, 113) <1, suggesting no evidence of
differences in performance in each affective context based on individual numeracy levels. The
Probability Display x Numeracy x Affective Context interaction was not significant, F(1, 113) =
1.33, ns. As shown in Figure 8, the only suggestion of an effect was for the benefit of the icon
array in the affect-poor condition for those low in numeracy. An exploratory post-hoc test
suggested that for those low in numeracy, choice may have been better in the affect-poor
condition when an icon array was present versus absent. This finding is consistent with previous
research demonstrating the benefit of icon arrays particularly for this group (Galesic et al., 2009;
Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010).
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Figure 8. Condition Means for the Probability Display x Numeracy x Affective Context
experimental design. Note. The three-way interaction was not significant.

Summary
The results of these analyses replicate the affect gap proposed by Pachur and colleagues
(2014), by demonstrating that participants made better choices in the affect-poor monetary
outcomes than in the affect-rich side effects. However, the results did not support the primary
hypothesis that the gap is caused by neglecting probability information, as the icon array was not
particularly beneficial when making decisions about side effects. Furthermore, performance
without the array was already rather high, which calls into question the explanation that
differences are due to probability insensitivity. Choosing the higher EV lottery requires
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integration of probability with outcomes, therefore, if individuals were neglecting probability, we
would expect that they would not be performing well. As probability insensitivity does not
appear to be responsible for the differences seen in affect-rich and affect-poor choice, it leaves
the possibility that outcome characteristics could be important. We will address this possibility in
Studies 2 and 3.
We found some evidence that if the icon array is going to be beneficial, it will be in the
affect-poor context, which may suggest that there is something inherent in the outcomes that is
leading to differences in choice. The only instance in which the icon array may have had an
effect was in the affect-poor condition for those low in numeracy. This result is in line with
previous research, which has shown that low numeracy individuals can benefit substantially from
the use of icon arrays (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010). Nevertheless, the
lack of an overall effect of the icon array suggests that the manipulation may not have been
strong enough to see benefits across numeracy levels in either affective context. However, the
possibility also exists that performance levels were already high enough for those high in
numeracy (approximately 80% in the affect-poor condition), that reminding individuals of
probability information with the icon array simply did not provide any additional benefit.
We did find that individuals high in numeracy were slightly better able to choose the
higher EV lottery than those low in numeracy, also replicating previous findings using this
paradigm (Pachur & Galesic, 2012). However, instead of finding a general boost in low
numerates’ performance across affective contexts with the addition of the icon array, we only
found evidence for an improvement in the affect-poor context. This suggests that use of the icon
array may only be beneficial when working with monetary (i.e., numerically quantified)
outcomes.
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STUDY 2
In Study 2, we explored whether differences in choice for affect-rich and affect-poor
outcomes could be due to differences in outcome comparability. To examine this possibility, we
altered the affect-rich condition of this study so that participants made choices between options
that involved the same side effect varying in level of severity (e.g., mild versus moderate
insomnia). Despite the fact that we did not observe a main effect of Probability Display in Study
1, we continued to explore the effect of this variable, as making the affect-rich outcomes more
comparable may elicit differences in the choice process. Our hypotheses for the main effect of
Probability Display, the main effect of Numeracy, and the Numeracy x Probability Display
interaction were the same as in Study 1.
With respect to the main effect of Affective Context, there were competing hypotheses:
S2-H1a: If differences in choice were due to probability insensitivity when affect is high, we
expected to see a similar pattern as that predicted in Study 1. We predicted that choice of the
lottery with the higher EV would continue to be greater for affect-poor choice than for affect-rich
choice.
S2-H1b: However, if differences were due to outcome comparability, then we predicted that the
differences in advantageous choices between the affect-poor and affect-rich context would at
least be reduced, or possibly eliminated.
With respect to the Probability Display x Affective Context interaction, there were
competing hypotheses:
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S2-H2a: If the probability insensitivity hypothesis was the primary driver of differences across
affective contexts, we expected findings to be the same as predicted for Study 1.
S2-H2b: However, if the differences were primarily due to characteristics of outcomes (and
assuming that explicit numeric outcomes are not essential), then we expected making the affectrich outcomes more comparable to one another would reduce the size of the interaction, or make
the interaction disappear, so that affect-rich and affect-poor choices would be more equally aided
by the addition of the icon array.
We also conducted a critical comparison across Study 1 and Study 2 to test the effect of
outcome comparability. We did this by comparing the ability to select the higher EV lottery for
non-comparable affect-rich outcomes in Study 1 and comparable affect-rich outcomes in Study
2.
S2-H3: We predicted that individuals would choose a greater proportion of higher EV lotteries
for affect-rich side effects in Study 2, wherein outcomes are on the same continuum and thus
more easily compared, than for the non-comparable affect-rich side effects in Study 1.
S2-H4: We predicted a Comparability x Probability Display interaction. Because outcomes
would be more comparable, we expected that choice of the higher EV lottery would be greater
for the affect-rich lotteries of Study 2 than Study 1 in both the numeric and +array conditions;
however, we expected that aligning the outcomes on the same scale and making the comparisons
essentially ordinal in nature in Study 2, would result in a larger boost in choice of higher EV
lotteries with the addition of the icon array than affect-rich choice in Study 1. If the interaction
was not present, it suggests that the ordinal nature of the scale is not a sufficient proxy for a
numeric value, and that the numeric value may be needed to facilitate integrations with
probability information.
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Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-eight participants enrolled in a psychology course at a large urban
university were recruited to participate in the study through an online system. They were
compensated with extra credit in a psychology course of their choosing. Based on a power
analysis, in order to be in a position to find a medium effect size with power = .80 and alpha =
.05 when comparing four independent groups, we needed 114 participants. After elimination of
16 participants, we were left with 112 participants for analysis. As was the case for Study 1,
there were some instances in which the lottery with the higher EV could not be determined.
Individual trials in which there were equal EVs were eliminated from analysis. Thirteen
individuals who fell below a threshold of 20% tied/missing data (i.e., having 3 or more tied EV
lotteries/missing choices, out of 18, for gamble pairs in each affective context) were eliminated.
Two more participants were eliminated for not following the instructions in the willingness-topay task (task described in the procedure), and one was eliminated for failing the affective
evaluation manipulation check (i.e., indicating the same affective value for each side effect).
Each individual was randomly assigned to view a condition of probability display within an
affect-rich and affect-poor context. This study was run contemporaneously with Study 1, and
participants were randomly assigned to one of all possible conditions.
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Design
Study 2 utilized the same Probability Display x Affective Context design that was used in
Study 1. The dependent variable remained the proportion of higher EV options chosen out of 18
choices.
Stimuli
The subset of side effects used in Study 2 was selected based on WTP data from Pachur
and colleagues (2014) as well as a pilot study of 135 USF psychology undergraduates. The goal
was to include side effects that were rated relatively consistently, but that, as a set, spanned the
spectrum of typical WTP values. In the pilot study, participants were asked to provide WTP
values for the original set of 12 side effects, as well as six side effects supplemented with the
categorical qualifiers of “slight,” “moderate,” and “severe.” The six side effects originally
chosen were: headache, fever, dizziness, insomnia, hallucinations, and memory loss. However, in
the present study, fatigue was substituted for headache to better align with Pachur and
colleagues’ (2014) original research. The final six side effects with categorical qualifiers were
used to construct the outcomes of the affect-rich lottery pairs in Study 2.
For each lottery pair in the affect-rich conditions, both options described the same
potential side effect but differed in terms of the categorical qualifier attached. For example,
Figure 9 displays Medication A with a 30% chance of experiencing mild insomnia, otherwise no
side effect, versus Medication B with a 10% chance of experiencing moderate insomnia,
otherwise no side effect.
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Figure 9. Example affect-rich numeric probability lottery pair in Study 2.

The lotteries used were constructed from those in Study 1. To do this, we first looked at
the WTP values for the side effects with categorical qualifiers gathered in the pilot study. These
values were matched inasmuch as possible to the WTP values for the side effects in Pachur and
colleagues (2014), as is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4.
Side Effect Outcomes Used in Study 1 and Matched Outcomes with Categorical Qualifier Used
in Study 2

For example, say the original lottery used by Pachur and colleagues (2014) depicted a
20% chance of hallucinations, otherwise no side effect, versus a 40% chance of fever, otherwise
no side effect. The WTP value obtained by Pachur and colleagues (2014) for hallucinations was
-$30 and for fever was -$10. These values were then matched to the WTP values obtained for the
side effects with categorical qualifiers in the pilot study. Slight and severe dizziness matched
these values exactly; slight dizziness had a WTP value of -$10 and severe dizziness had a WTP
value of -$30. Therefore, these side effects with the categorical qualifiers replaced the original
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side effects used by Pachur and colleagues (2014), to create a lottery pair that displayed a 20%
chance of severe dizziness, otherwise nothing, versus a 40% chance of slight dizziness, otherwise
nothing. The three possible combinations of slight, moderate, and severe were applied to each of
the 6 side effects, allowing us to substitute outcomes for each of the 18 lottery pairs used in
Study 1. Table 5 displays the complete set of lottery pairs created for Study 2.
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Table 5.
Complete List of 18 Lottery Pairs Used in Study 2

The affect-poor portion of the task used lotteries with the same sets of probabilities as
those used in the affect-rich context. However, the side effects used in the affect-rich task were
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replaced by each participant’s corresponding WTP value. The WTP task was similar to that
described in Study 1. However, the 18 outcomes to be evaluated in this case were the 3
combinations of categorical qualifiers applied to each of the 6 side effects. For example,
participants were asked to indicate how much money they would pay to avoid mild insomnia,
moderate insomnia, and severe insomnia.
The stimuli for the affective evaluation included the six side effects with each of the three
attached categorical qualifiers in addition to the 18 WTP values generated for each side effect.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with the exception of using the modified side
effect stimuli.
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Results
In what follows, we assessed whether differences in choice for affect-rich and affect-poor
outcomes could be due to differences in outcome comparability, while continuing to look for
signs of probability insensitivity. Our first analysis was a manipulation check, testing whether
the affect-rich outcomes derived a greater amount of negative affect than the affect-poor
outcomes. The primary analysis specifically tested whether the affect gap was still present in our
lottery task when affect-rich outcomes were put on an ordinal scale and made more comparable
through creating lotteries that involve a choice between the same side effect varying in level of
severity. Furthermore, we again explored whether the addition of the icon array has an impact on
the presence of the gap, in this case when the affect-rich outcomes are made comparable. In this
analysis, we also assessed the potential moderating influence of numeracy. Our final analysis
was a comparison of affect-rich outcomes across Studies 1 and 2 (which were simultaneously
randomly assigned) to assess the effect of outcome comparability.
Monetary and Affective Evaluation
As was done in Study 1, we began with a manipulation check to ensure that our affectrich stimuli generated greater negative affect than our affect-poor stimuli. The mean affect
ratings are shown for each affect-rich side effect and its affect-poor monetary equivalent in Table
6. We utilized a repeated measures MANOVA to analyze the affect ratings for the affect-rich
side effects and the matched affect-poor monetary values. We found a large main effect of
affective context, F(18, 87)= 11.64, p< .001, 𝑛!! = .71, indicating that our affect-rich outcomes
(M= 6.44, SD= 1.06) were rated as generating significantly more negative affect than the affect-
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poor monetary equivalents (M= 5.05, SD= 1.74). Additionally, follow-up univariate analyses
demonstrated that with the exception of slight dizziness, each affect-rich side effect elicited a
significantly greater amount of negative affect than its affect-poor monetary equivalent.
Also displayed in Table 6 are the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile responses for the monetary
evaluation task to demonstrate the variability in the WTP values. The overall median WTP value
in Study 2 was -$15, which was comparable to the overall median of -$10 in Study 1.
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Table 6.
Willingness-To-Pay Percentile Values for the Affect-Rich Outcomes, and Mean and Standard
Deviations of Affective Ratings for the Affect-Rich Outcomes and Their Affect-Poor Monetary
Equivalents in Study 2

Note. CI = confidence interval. The 95% CIs refer to the difference between the average affect
rating for the affect-rich side effects and the average affect rating for the affect-poor willingnessto-pay values. Ratings for the affective evaluation ranged from 1 (not upset) to 10 (very upset).

Lottery Task
As was done in Study 1, we conducted a 2x2x2 Probability Display x Numeracy x
Affective Context mixed ANOVA. The results are displayed in Figure 10. The dependent
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measure for this analysis was the proportion of choices of the higher EV lottery out of a possible
15 to 18 total choices.
Computer error caused one question on the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale to be excluded
from analysis (i.e., “If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as
having a _____% chance of getting the disease”). The reliability of this measure without this
item was α= .63, indicating adequate reliability. A median split was used to classify groups into
low numeracy (i.e., scores of 0-3; N=67) and high numeracy (i.e., scores of 4-7; N=45) for
analysis.
Replicating both previous research (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter,
Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) and Study 1, we found a significant main effect of affective context,
F(1, 108)= 17.74, p< .001, 𝑛!! = .14, which is displayed in Figure 10. Individuals were more
inclined to choose the higher EV lottery in the affect-poor (M= 72.25%, SD= 15.22%) than in the
affect-rich (M= 64.19%, SD= 14.26%) condition. This supported Hypothesis S2-H1a, and was
the only significant effect in the omnibus analysis.
Contrary to our predictions, none of the effects involving probability display were
significant (p > .05 for all comparisons). Therefore, there was no evidence that viewing the
+array condition led to benefits in choice over viewing the numeric condition, or that this was in
any way moderated by affective context or numeracy. In particular, we did not find a Probability
Display x Affective Context interaction, F(1, 108) <1. It appears that the addition of the icon
array did not have any influence in either of the affective contexts. These findings are similar to
those observed in Study 1, again casting doubt on the hypothesis that poorer performance is due
to a lack of attention to probability information.
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There was no evidence that performance differed as a function of numeracy (p > .05 for
all comparisons). In general, the proportion of higher EV choices was similar for individuals
high and low in numeracy, and this did not change depending on the affective context or
presence of a probability display. Correlations supported this, and demonstrated that there was
no relationship between numeracy and choice in the affect-rich (r(112)= .09, ns) or affect-poor
(r(112)= .17, ns) conditions.
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Figure 10. Condition Means for the Probability Display x Numeracy x Affective Context
experimental design in Study 2. Note. The three-way interaction was not significant.

In Hypothesis, S2-H1b, we predicted that making the affect-rich outcomes more
comparable would reduce the difference in higher EV choices between the affect-rich and affect-
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poor conditions relative to the difference between the same conditions in Study 1. To test this,
we created difference scores from subtracting proportion of choice in the higher EV lottery in the
affect-rich context from the affect-poor context for Studies 1 and 2. We then conducted an
independent samples t-test of the difference scores from each study. There was no evidence that
the average difference in scores between the affective contexts was smaller in Study 2 than Study
1, t(227) <1. Therefore, the aforementioned support for Hypothesis S2-H1a, and the lack of
evidence in support of S2-H1b, suggests that differences in choice may not be attributed to a
difference in outcome comparability.
Comparability Analysis
We provided a critical test of outcome comparability across studies by examining
differences in choice between the affect-rich lotteries only, by comparing the less comparable
affect-rich lotteries of Study 1, with the more comparable affect-rich lotteries of Study 2. We
conducted a 2x2 Comparability x Probability Display between-subjects ANOVA, which is
displayed in Figure 11. Comparability is a between-subjects variable representing whether the
outcomes were non-comparable in Study 1 or more comparable in Study 2.
We found a small main effect of comparability, F(1, 225)= 6.42, p= .01, 𝑛!! = .03,
however, to our surprise, it was in the opposite direction of that predicted by Hypothesis S2-H3.
It appears that increasing comparability in Study 2 did not increase the proportion of choices for
the higher EV lottery. In fact, individuals were slightly better able to perform this task in Study 1
(M= 68.96%, SD= 14.22%) when outcomes were less comparable, than in Study 2 (M= 64.19%,
SD= 14.26%), when they were on the same continuum. We were interested in the possibility that
this difference may have arisen because WTP values in Study 1 were more spread out across the
side effects. This could have lead to larger differences in the EV of the options included in each
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lottery pair, potentially facilitating choice, as discriminating between the options would be less
difficult. To explore this, we assessed the average EV differences for all 18 lotteries using the
median WTP values. A t-test demonstrated that there were no differences between Studies 1 and
2 in the average difference in EV between each option in a pair, t(17)= 1.77, ns. Thus,
discrimination of the lottery with the higher EV should not have been any easier in Study 1 than
it was in Study 2. This further supports the notion that making outcomes more comparable did
not facilitate choice in the affect-rich lotteries.
Neither the main effect of probability display nor the Comparability x Probability Display
interaction was significant, F’s (1, 225) <1. Therefore, contrary to our prediction, choice in the
more comparable affect-rich outcomes in Study 2 was not aided more by the addition of the icon
array, than choice for the less comparable outcomes of Study 1. This result further supports the
notion that the icon array may not be beneficial when working with non-numeric side effect
information, even if this information is put on a continuum and described in terms of ordinal
differences.

Percent of Choices of Higher EV Lottery
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Figure 11. Comparison of choice for the higher EV lottery in the affect-rich context of Studies 1
and 2.

Summary
In Study 2, we again replicated previous findings (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al.,
2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015), demonstrating that individuals were better able to choose
the higher EV lottery in an affect-poor than an affect-rich condition. Thus, even when the affectrich outcomes were put on the same ordered continuum, the differences in the ability to choose
the higher EV option remained. Although previous research has demonstrated that it is easier to
make comparisons between options that are comparable (Johnson, 1984), we did not find that
increasing outcome comparability eliminated the differences in choice between the affect-rich
and affect-poor domains. In fact, we found that within the affect-rich context, individuals were
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actually slightly better at choosing the higher EV lottery when the outcomes were less
comparable in Study 1, than when they were more comparable in Study 2.
We again found no evidence that adding the icon array to the numeric probability
improved selection of higher EV options, regardless of the affective context. This casts some
doubt on the hypothesis that the differences in affect-rich and affect-poor choice are due to
probability insensitivity, as was proposed by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012;
Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015). If the differences were due to probability
insensitivity, we would expect that making the probability information salient in the array would
improve choice. However, the lack of benefit seen with the addition of the array in the affect-rich
context of both Studies 1 and 2 suggests that probability may not be ignored, but rather, the issue
is at the level of integration of this information with the non-numeric side effect outcomes. It
appears that even creating an ordinal continuum of side effect information, as was done in Study
2, is not a sufficient substitution for a numeric value when attempting to integrate probability and
outcome information.
One potential benefit that was seen by improving comparability was that it allowed
individuals varying in numeracy to similarly process the information presented for choice.
However, it is possible that this may be due to decreased performance. Overall, the results
suggest that outcome comparability does not appear to be a primary contributor in the differences
observed in affect-rich and affect-poor choice.
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STUDY 3
In Study 3, we examined how the precision of outcomes influenced choice behavior in an
affect-rich and affect-poor context. As was done in Study 2, we continued to employ the use of
comparisons of the same six side effects varying in severity. However, in Study 3, the affectpoor values were categorized into a range of values and described on an ordered continuum of
amounts (e.g. $15-$29 representing a “small” amount of money). The use of a range of numeric
values on a continuum introduced a lack of precision similar to the kind of vagueness that is
likely to characterize slight, moderate, and severe side effect outcomes. This allows for
comparisons of outcomes that are roughly equivalent with regard to level of precision across the
affect-rich and affect-poor contexts. In case the numeric component may have still differentiated
the two types of outcomes, we also introduced a commonly-used numeric intensity range to
accompany the affect-rich outcomes. Thus, if numeric outcomes facilitate integration with
probabilities to compute EV, both affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes will have enjoyed the
same advantage. Although we did not find strong effects involving Probability Display in Studies
1 or 2, we continued to investigate whether differences in choice would emerge with the addition
of an icon array when outcomes were better aligned in terms of precision.
Our hypotheses with respect to the main effect of Probability Display, the Probability
Display x Affective Context interaction, the main effect of Numeracy, and the Probability
Display x Numeracy interaction were the same as in Study 2.
With respect to the main effect of Affective Context in Study 3, there were competing
hypotheses:
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S3-H1a: If choice differences were due to probability insensitivity when affect is rich, we
expected to see a similar pattern as that predicted in Studies 1 and 2, with a greater proportion of
higher EV lotteries chosen in the affect-poor than affect-rich context.
S3-H1b: However, if differences were due to outcome precision, we predicted that the addition
of vagueness will reduce the ability of those in the affect-poor conditions to reliably identify the
higher EV lottery. Moreover, adding numbers to the affect-rich ranges would also serve to equate
the two contexts. Together, this was expected to result in a similar proportion of higher EV
lotteries being chosen in the affect-poor and affect-rich contexts. Aligning the level of precision
and using numeric values in both contexts should cause the main effect of Affective Context to
disappear.
In addition to the hypotheses described above, we provided a stronger assessment of the
effect of precision by making a direct comparison across the relatively vague affect-poor lotteries
in Study 3 and the precisely defined affect-poor lotteries in Study 2.
S3-H2: If precision facilitated deriving EV, we predicted that individuals would choose a smaller
proportion of higher EV lotteries with the vague outcomes in Study 3, than with the precise
outcomes in Study 2. However, a Precision x Probability Display interaction could have resulted
if introducing vagueness into the outcomes interferes with the ability to properly integrate
probability and outcome information, and reduced the usefulness of the icon array.
We also assessed the effect of adding numeric values to severity categories by comparing
choices for the affect-rich lotteries in Studies 2 and 3.
S3-H3: If numeric values facilitated deriving EV, individuals would choose a larger proportion
of lotteries with the higher EV in Study 3, wherein the affect-rich outcomes have numeric value
labels, than in Study 2, wherein they do not have numeric value labels. Additionally, a Numeric
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Value x Probability Display interaction could have resulted if introducing the numeric value
labels facilitated the ability to properly integrate probability and outcome information, and
increased the usefulness of the icon array.
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Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-nine participants enrolled in a psychology course at a large urban
university were recruited to participate in the study through an online system. They were
compensated with extra credit in a psychology course of their choosing. Based on a power
analysis, in order to be in a position to find a medium effect size with power = .80 and alpha =
.05 when comparing four independent groups, we needed 114 participants. Thirteen participants
were eliminated from the data set, leaving 116 participants for analysis.
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, there were trials in which EV may have been equal for both
lotteries in a pair. As was done in Studies 1 and 2, any participant with greater than three tied
and/or missing trials in each affective context was eliminated. Six were eliminated for having
tied/missing data at a threshold of 20% or greater (i.e., having 3 or more tied EV
lotteries/missing choices, out of 18, for gamble pairs in each affective context). An additional six
participants were eliminated for not following the instructions in the willingness-to-pay task
(e.g., indicating the same WTP for all side effects; task described in the procedure), and one was
eliminated for computer error in the lottery choice task.
This study was run contemporaneously with Studies 1 and 2, and participants were
randomly assigned to one of all possible conditions.
Design
The design did not differ from Studies 1 and 2. The dependent variable remained the
proportion of higher EV options chosen out of 18 choices.
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Stimuli
The same selection of affect-rich lottery pairs comprised of side effects with categorical
qualifiers that was utilized in Study 2 was used as the affect-rich lotteries in Study 3.
Additionally, as a way to potentially facilitate EV calculation in the affect-rich context, a range
from the numeric 0-10 intensity scale shown in Figure 12 was added to each outcome.

Figure 12. Example intensity scale used with the affect-rich side effects in the WTP task in
Study 3.

An example affect-rich numeric lottery pair is shown in Figure 13 on the next page.
Outcomes with the categorical qualifier “slight” were associated with intensity values 1-3,
“moderate” with values 4-6, and “severe” with values 7-9.

Figure 13. Example affect-rich numeric lottery pair used in Study 3.
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The affect-poor stimuli for the lottery task was derived from each participant’s WTP
value provided in the modified WTP task, described in more detail in the procedure. Affect-poor
lotteries utilized the same probabilities as those displayed in the affect-rich context; however, the
side effect outcomes were replaced by the WTP value ranges. An example is displayed in Figure
14 below.

Figure 14. Example affect-poor numeric lottery pair used in Study 3.

The stimuli for the affective evaluation task included the six side effects with categorical
qualifiers in addition to the WTP value ranges selected in the monetary evaluation task.

Procedure
The procedure did not differ from Studies 1 and 2, with the exception of the WTP task. In
this task, participants viewed each side effect with its severity qualifier, along with a numeric
range of discomfort intensity values. Before completing the WTP task, participants viewed the
discomfort intensity scale shown in Figure 11. This scale provided a legend to inform
participants of the range of numeric intensity values that accompanied each side effect’s severity
qualifier (e.g., “slight” has a severity intensity range of 1-3). This scale remained visible
throughout the WTP task.
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Participants were then asked to indicate how much they would be willing to pay to avoid
each side effect using a set of five ranges of numeric monetary values. These are shown in Figure
15. The numeric values assigned to each range were created based on the WTP values gathered
in the pilot study described previously. Specific values for each range were chosen to minimize
the potential that a participant would select the same WTP range for two different severity
categories of the same side effect (e.g., slight versus moderate insomnia). As shown in Figure 15,
each range of numeric values were also described by a corresponding verbal label: “very small
amount,” “small amount,” “medium amount,” “large amount,” and “very large amount.” After
selecting the desired category, the participant indicated the specific WTP value to assist in
calculating criterion EVs using the same procedure as in Studies 1 and 2.

Figure 15. Example questions used in WTP task in Study 3.
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Results
In what follows, we assessed whether differences in choice for affect-rich and affect-poor
outcomes could be influenced by outcome precision. Our first analysis was again a manipulation
check to confirm that the affect-rich outcomes generated more negative affect than the affectpoor outcomes. The primary analysis tested whether the affect gap was still present in our lottery
task when affect-poor outcomes were made more vague through the use of numeric value ranges
as outcomes. As we have observed little evidence of a difference in choice when utilizing an icon
array, we explored whether the array would become beneficial when affect-poor outcomes were
made less precise. We also assessed whether choice of the higher EV lottery would differ based
on level of numeracy, as was the case in Study 1.
We also completed a cross-study comparison. We began with a test of the role of
precision on choice. We compared the precise affect-poor outcomes of Study 2 with the
relatively vague outcomes of Study 3 to determine the effect of outcome precision on choice for
the higher EV lottery. We expected that making the affect-poor outcomes less precise in Study 3
would lead to a smaller proportion of higher EV lottery choices, compared with choice for the
precise affect-poor outcomes of Study 2. Our final test was that of numeric values, in which we
make a comparison between the affect-rich outcomes without a numeric value in Study 2, and
the affect-rich outcomes with the numeric intensity ranges in Study 3. The goal of this analysis
was to determine whether the presence of numeric outcomes in the affect-rich context would
facilitate integration with probabilities, leading to a greater proportion of higher EV choices.
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Monetary and Affective Evaluation
As was done in Studies 1 and 2, we began with a manipulation check to ensure that our
affect-rich stimuli generated greater negative affect than our affect-poor stimuli. In the present
Study, the affect-rich stimuli consisted of side effects on a continuum, accompanied by numeric
intensity ranges. Comparatively, the affect-poor stimuli were vague numeric ranges. To make
this comparison, each side effect needed to have a comparable outcome in the affect-poor
condition. However, there were only five affective ratings given for the affect-poor outcomes;
one for each of the five numeric outcome ranges. To test the affective ratings of the affect-rich
and their matched affect-poor outcomes, we utilized the affective rating associated with a given
numeric range, based on the range selected in the WTP task for each side effect. For example, if
a participant had specified they would be willing-to-pay under $15 (i.e., range 1) to avoid slight
fatigue, we then utilized the affective rating associated with this range (i.e., range 1) as the
comparable affect-poor outcome to the affective evaluation given for the affect-rich.
The mean affect ratings are shown for each affect-rich side effect and its affect-poor
monetary equivalent in Table 7. We utilized a repeated measures MANOVA to analyze the
affect ratings for the affect-rich side effects and the matched affect-poor monetary values. We
found a significant main effect of affective context, F(18, 91)= 6.10, p< .001, 𝑛!! = .55,
indicating that our affect-rich outcomes (M= 6.27, SD= 1.05) were rated as generating
significantly more negative affect than the affect-poor monetary equivalents (M= 5.55, SD=
1.94). Follow-up univariate analyses demonstrated that the majority of affect-rich side effects
elicited a significantly greater amount of negative affect than their affect-poor monetary
equivalents. The exceptions to this were slight fatigue, slight fever, slight dizziness, slight
insomnia, slight hallucinations, slight memory loss, and moderate memory loss, in which there
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were no discernible differences between the negative affect generated for the affect-rich and
affect-poor equivalents.
Also displayed in Table 7 are the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile responses for the monetary
evaluation task to demonstrate the variability in the exact WTP values that were indicated
simultaneously with the category values.
Table 7.
Willingness-To-Pay Percentile Values for the Affect-Rich Outcomes, and Mean and Standard
Deviations of Affective Ratings for the Affect-Rich Outcomes and Their Affect-Poor Monetary
Equivalents in Study 3

Note. CI = confidence interval. The 95% CIs refer to the difference between the average affect
rating for the affect-rich side effects and the average affect rating for the affect-poor willingnessto-pay values. Ratings for the affective evaluation ranged from 1 (not upset) to 10 (very upset).
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Lottery Task
As was done in Study 1 and Study 2, a 2x2x2 Probability Display x Numeracy x
Affective Context mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results are displayed in Figure 16. The
primary dependent measure was the proportion of choices of the higher EV lottery out of a
possible 15 to 18 total choices in each affective context.
We again experience a computer error in which one question on the Abbreviated
Numeracy Scale had to be eliminated from analysis (i.e., “If the chance of getting a disease is 20
out of 100, this would be the same as having a _____% chance of getting the disease”). The
reliability of this measure without this item was α= .64, indicating adequate reliability. A median
split was used to classify groups into low numeracy (i.e., scores of 0-3; N=65) and high
numeracy (i.e., scores of 4-7; N=51) for analysis.
In support of our prediction, we found a significant main effect of probability display,
F(1,112)= 8.74, p= .004, 𝑛!! = .07, displayed in Figure 16. We found a greater average proportion
of higher EV lottery choices in the +array condition (M= 68.69%, SD= 13.70%) than the numeric
condition (M= 61.86%, SD= 12.95%). This suggests that the probability display can be beneficial
in some cases, particularly when the affect-poor outcomes are vague.
In Hypothesis S3-H1b, we predicted that the main effect of affective context would
disappear due to inserting a level of vagueness into the affect-poor outcomes. Consistent with
this, there was no main effect of affective context, F(1,112)= 2.59, ns. Therefore, there was a
lack of evidence of a systematic difference in the proportion of choices for the higher EV lottery
when viewing the affect-rich lotteries (M= 63.59%, SD= 19.10%) versus the affect-poor lotteries
(M= 66.95%, SD= 16.75%). Contrary to our prediction, there was no main effect of numeracy,
F(1,112) < 1, with similar average proportions of higher EV lottery choice for those low (M=
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65.94%, SD= 13.70%) and high (M= 65.50%, SD= 10.71%) in numeracy. Correlations between
numeracy and choice in each affective context did not show a significant relationship (r(58)= .25, ns and r(58)= -.22, ns, for affect-rich and affect-poor numeric condition, respectively, and
r(58)= .08, ns and r(58)= .16, ns for affect-rich and affect-poor +array condition, respectively).
As was the case in Studies 1 and 2, our Probability Display x Affective Context
interaction was not significant, F(1,112) = 2.81, ns. Thus, the probability insensitivity hypothesis
was once again called into question, as we continued to find no evidence in support of this
prediction.
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80%
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Numeric

+Array
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High Numeracy
Percent of Choices of Higher EV Lottery

Percent of Choices of Higher EV Lottery

Low Numeracy
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50%
Numeric
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Probability Display

Figure 16. Condition Means for the Probability Display x Numeracy x Affective Context
experimental design in Study 3. Note. The three-way interaction was not significant.
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As can be seen in Figure 16, we found a significant Probability Display x Numeracy
interaction, F(1,112)= 4.05, p= .05, 𝑛!! = .04; however, it was not in line with our prediction. We
predicted that individuals high in numeracy would choose a greater proportion of higher EV
lotteries than those low in numeracy in both the numeric and the icon array conditions, but that
individuals low in numeracy would get a larger boost in performance with the addition of the
icon array. Instead, we found the opposite pattern, in which individuals high in numeracy
received a bigger boost in performance from the addition of the icon array. Simple effects
follow-up tests demonstrated that for individuals low in numeracy, there was no evidence of
differences across the numeric or +array conditions in average choice rates for the higher EV
lottery, F(1,112) = 1.04, ns. However, for those high in numeracy, choice for the higher EV
lottery was greater on average with the icon array than it was without, F(1,112)= 10.30, p= .002,
𝑛!! = .08. It is possible that only the high numeracy individuals benefitted from the icon array
because those low in numeracy struggled with interpreting the vague outcome information,
which made integration with the probability difficult.
Neither the Numeracy x Affective Context nor the Probability Display x Numeracy x
Affective Context interaction was significant, F’s(1,112) <1. Thus, there was little evidence of
differences in choice between the affective contexts based on the presence or absence of an icon
array.
Test of Precision
We directly examined the effect of precision on choice for the higher EV lottery by
making a comparison between the precise affect-poor outcomes of Study 2, and the vague affectpoor outcomes of Study 3. We conducted a 2x2 Precision x Probability Display between-subjects
ANOVA, which is displayed in Figure 17. Precision was a between-subjects variable
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representing whether the affect-poor outcomes were precise (i.e., ratio scale) in Study 2 or vague
(i.e., ordinal scale) in Study 3. In line with Hypothesis S3-H2, we found a small, but significant,
main effect of precision, F(1, 224)= 6.68, p= .01, 𝑛!! = .03. Individuals were better able to choose
the higher EV lottery on average when the affect-poor outcomes were more precise in Study 2
(M= 72.25%, SD= 15.22%) than when they were vague in Study 3 (M= 66.95%, SD= 16.75%).
The Precision x Probability Display interaction approached significance, F(1, 224)= 3.81, p=
.052. As this effect was a key prediction, we conducted follow-up tests, which suggested that,
when viewing numeric lotteries without the icon array, individuals chose a greater proportion of
higher EV lotteries when the affect-poor outcomes were precise (Study 2), than when the affectpoor outcomes were vague (Study 3), F(1, 224)= 10.58, p= .001, 𝑛!! = .05. However, when the
icon array was present, choice of the higher EV lottery was similar for options with precise and
vague outcomes, F(1, 224) <1. This result suggests that without an accompanying array,
vagueness of the affect-poor outcomes of Study 3 hindered individuals’ ability to choose the
higher EV lottery, compared to choice in the same condition of Study 2. However, with the icon
array, individuals’ performance in Study 3 was boosted to levels comparable to that seen in the
more precise Study 2 affect-poor lotteries.

Percent of Choices of Higher EV Lottery
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Figure 17. Comparison of choice for the higher EV lottery in the affect-poor context of Studies 2
and 3.

Test of Numeric Intensity Ranges
We also assessed the effect of adding numeric intensity ranges to severity categories by
comparing choices for the affect-rich lotteries in Studies 2 and 3. We conducted a 2x2 Numeric
Intensity Range x Probability Display between-subjects ANOVA, displayed in Figure 18.
Numeric Intensity Range was a between-subjects variable representing whether a range of
numeric values was present (Study 3) or absent (Study 2) from the side effect outcomes.
Contrary to Hypothesis S3-H3, wherein we predicted that the presence of the numeric intensity
range would facilitate choice, the main effect of numeric intensity range was not significant, F(1,
224) <1. Therefore, there was no convincing evidence that adding the numeric intensity range in
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the affect-rich context of Study 3 lead to better choice than when the range was not present in the
affect-rich context of Study 2. We also did not find a significant Numeric Intensity Range x
Probability Display interaction, F(1, 224) <1. Therefore, we did not find evidence that
introducing the numeric intensity ranges facilitated the ability to properly integrate probability
and outcome information, thus it did not increase the usefulness of the icon array.
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Figure 18. Comparison of choice for the higher EV lottery in the affect-rich context of Studies 2
and 3.

Summary
The results of Study 3 suggest one possible explanation for the differences in affect-rich
and affect-poor choice. Specifically, a disparity in outcome precision between the two affective
contexts may be leading to the different patterns of choice. In support of our precision
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hypothesis, we found that making affect-poor outcomes less precise, by displaying ranges of
numeric values instead of exact numeric values, eliminated the differences in affect-rich and
affect-poor choice, which were seen previously in both Studies 1 and 2. We found further
support that precision matters when comparing choice in the affect-poor lotteries for Study 2 and
Study 3. Choice was hindered without precise outcomes, at least when an icon array was not
available.
The results also suggest that the addition of the icon array may be helpful when affectpoor information is less precise. Furthermore, this facilitation was largely driven by performance
of individuals high in numeracy. It is possible that in a vague affect-poor environment, the icon
array facilitated attention to and use of probability information. This was likely seen only in
individuals high in numeracy because those low in numeracy may have struggled with
comprehending the vague outcome information and integrating this with probability. It appears
that the addition of the icon array allowed individuals (particularly those high in numeracy) to
overcome some of the challenges faced when the affect-poor information was vague.
Finally, we found no evidence that adding numeric intensity ranges to the affect-rich
outcomes facilitated choice. It appears that despite the numeric component, the vagueness of the
range presents a challenge for integrating probability and outcome information, which further
supports our precision hypothesis.
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General Discussion
The goal of the present study was to explore potential explanations for the affect gap,
originally described by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014;
Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015). We investigated whether the differences in choice between
affect-rich and affect-poor contexts could be due to probability insensitivity in the presence of
affect, and sought to remediate this potential issue with the use of icon arrays. We further
explored whether characteristics of outcomes, namely outcome comparability and precision,
might be an explanation for the affect gap.
In general, our results replicated Pachur and colleagues, and demonstrated a tendency for
performance in the affect-rich side effects to be less than the affect-poor monetary outcomes.
However, this only held true when the affect-poor monetary outcomes were more precise than
the affect-rich outcomes, suggesting that the affect gap may be related to routine differences in
outcome precision across affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes. We found little evidence that the
icon array was beneficial in bringing attention to probability, casting doubt on the probability
insensitivity hypothesis. There was also no support for the outcome comparability hypothesis.
Thus, only a discrepancy in outcome precision remains as a likely alternative to affect as an
explanation for the difference in affect-rich and affect-poor choice.
The Influence of Icon Arrays
Utilizing probability displayed as an icon array did not seem beneficial in most cases.
Across the three studies, we found no evidence of any benefit when using the icon array in the
affect-rich context, despite the prediction that the array would be especially helpful when making
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choices about side effects if probability insensitivity was an obstacle to choice. Furthermore,
there was only an occasional suggestion of benefit for the icon array in the affect-poor context.
In Study 1, there was a suggestion that individuals low in numeracy received some
benefit with the addition of the icon array when viewing the monetary outcomes. This finding is
consistent with research showing that icon arrays may be especially helpful when low numeracy
individuals are working with numerical information (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero &
Galesic, 2010). However, this benefit did not extend to those who were high in numeracy. We
found no benefit of the icon array in Study 2 for either high or low numerates, which suggests
that making the side effect outcomes more comparable to one another did not facilitate the use of
this visual aid.
One context in which the array was advantageous was with the vague monetary outcomes
in Study 3. We found that adding the array to the vague affect-poor information boosted choice
quality to the same level as it had been for the precise affect-poor outcomes in Study 2. This
finding seems to be driven by the choice of high numeracy individuals in this affect-poor
condition. We did not observe the same benefit for those low in numeracy, as we did in Study 1,
although the effect was in the correct direction. It is possible that making the affect-poor
information vague created an especially problematic situation for those low in numeracy,
whereas individuals high in numeracy were more equipped to integrate the visual probability
information depicted in the icon array. This is in line with the idea that low numeracy individuals
less frequently incorporate multiple pieces of information in their decision (cf. Peters et al.,
2006). It would be reasonable to suggest that this is especially so when there is added difficulty
processing vague information. This is also supported by research demonstrating that individuals
high in numeracy have a superior understanding of numeric information and utilize it more

82
frequently in their decisions (Peters & Levin, 2008). Furthermore, they are better able to work
with complex numeric information and utilize it in preference construction (Peters & Levin,
2008). The added complexity of the vague monetary outcomes may have been have been
challenging, but the high numerates were able to overcome this when probability was presented
visually in the icon array.
Overall, it appears that it is only when deciding about monetary outcomes that any
benefits of the icon array were observed. Comparatively, when making a choice between affectrich side effects, drawing attention to probability through the use of an icon array did not
facilitate choice. One possibility for why we did not find benefits with the affect-rich side effects
involves potential problems with the integration of probability and qualitative outcome
information. While combining two numbers (i.e., probability and monetary outcome) is
straightforward, attempting to combine a number with a side effect is more challenging. For
example, McGraw and colleagues (2010) discuss how non-monetary (and non-numeric)
outcomes do not instinctively elicit a numeric valuation, and how this becomes problematic
when attempting to combine this non-numeric component with probability. In order to
appropriately integrate the probability and outcome information, the non-numeric valuations
must be transformed into a monetary or numeric figure. It is plausible that in the affect-rich
context individuals are aware of the probability information, but they are unable to integrate it
appropriately with the non-numeric outcome information of potential drug side effects.
The general lack of additional effects involving the probability display might also be
related to the high levels of performance, even without the icon array. We found that when
utilizing just the numeric probability, individuals on average chose the higher EV lottery in 77%
and 71% of cases in Studies 1and 2, respectively. Even in the affect-rich condition, performance
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was relatively high, with choice for the higher EV lottery at 69% in Study 1 and 65% in Study 2.
In general, these rates are much higher than those found in the numeric conditions of research
utilizing icon arrays, which, on average, is closer to 50% without an aid (Galesic et al. 2009;
Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Hawley et al., 2008; Waters et al., 2007). Comparatively,
with the probability array, choice for the better lottery in the affect-poor condition was 80% and
73% in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Performance in the affect-rich condition with the array was
also good, at 69% for Study 1 and 64% for Study 2.These rates are similar to those found in
other risk research when using similar probability aids, with averages around 70% (Galesic et al.
2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Hawley et al., 2008; Waters et al., 2007).
Given that performance was already good without the array, it is possible that the
addition of the icon array did not lead to further improvements because individuals did not need
the array to further draw their attention to, or help them process, the probability information
being presented when outcomes were precise. However, when outcomes were vague, individuals
may have relied more on the visual probability, as there may have been an increased focus on
processing the vague outcomes and increased difficulty integrating the vague monetary outcomes
with the probability information.
The question remains as to why performance was as good as it was, even without a visual
aid for probability information. In the present study, we made multiple enhancements to the
presentation of stimuli in all conditions that may account for the higher levels of performance.
First, we used fewer words to present the probability and outcome information, which simplified
the information to be processed. Previous research has shown, particularly in a medical context,
that presenting fewer words leads to increased comprehension of instructions (Jolly, Scott, &
Sanford, 1995). This is also in line with the idea that “less is more,” in which choice is aided by
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presenting only the most important information (Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon, Hibbard, & Mertz,
2007). We also increased the overall size of the stimuli, while placing further emphasis
specifically on the probability and outcome by bolding both pieces of information, and making
them larger than the surrounding text. Peters and colleagues (2007) demonstrated how
highlighting the most important information to be used increased both comprehension and
quality of choice over information that was not highlighted. In the present series of studies,
highlighting the probability and outcome information may have helped make the most relevant
pieces salient, which resulted in better choice (Peters et al., 2007).
A final possibility is that the icon array manipulation may not have been strong enough,
thus, the probability displays could have been inefficacious. However, this seems unlikely,
especially given the effects observed in Study 3. We developed our icon arrays to be similar to
those used previously in risk research; therefore, we expected that they would provide benefit.
For example, following Hawley and colleagues (2008) and Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2010),
our displays used 10 x 10 square grids of 100 total icons. By using circles filled in with an “X” to
represent probability of non-zero outcomes, we combined the methods used previously by
Galesic and colleagues (2009), Garcia-Retamero and colleagues (2010), Garcia-Retamero and
Galesic (2010), and Waters and colleagues (2007). These authors used circles that were
completely filled with black (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero et al. 2010; Garcia-Retamero
& Galesic, 2010) or rectangles than encased a shape (Waters et al., 2007). Thus, our icon arrays,
though displaying slight differences, shared similar properties to other displays that have been
effective in previous research.
On review, we identified one potentially important difference between the much of the
research using icon arrays and the current research. Specifically, previous tasks have utilized the
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displays in a paradigm in which an individual must calculate the risk reduction associated with a
given treatment. In this paradigm, individuals are often given two arrays, which accompany the
numeric information, and compare the risk of the same disease with and without treatment.
Comparatively, the paradigm used in the present research utilizes different outcome information
for each option and requires an integration of this with probability. Therefore, it is possible that
we found little evidence for the use of an icon array because previous paradigms have used the
array to represent a change of likelihood in single event, whereas we used arrays to depict
independent probabilities that have to be integrated with two different outcomes.
In sum, our results cast doubt on the probability insensitivity explanation as was put forth
by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, &
Hertwig, 2015). In their interpretation of probability insensitivity, the authors’ focus primarily on
probability neglect or discounting as the cause of differences in affect-rich and affect-poor
choice. However, our results suggest that it may not be that individuals aren’t paying attention to
probability, but rather they have difficulty integrating this information with outcomes. Pachur
and colleagues (2014) make a small acknowledgement to this idea, and the present series of
studies lends more weight to the possibility that it is integration rather than attention.
Differences in Affect-Rich and Affect-Poor Choice
Outcome Comparability.
One primary difference between the affect-rich side effects and affect-poor monetary
outcomes used by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter,
Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) exists at the level of comparability between the outcomes used in
choice. In the affect-poor context, comparisons were made between two monetary amounts,
which share the same attributes and exist on the same continuum. However, in the affect-rich
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context, comparisons were made between two side effects that likely do not share the same
attributes and do not represent a single continuum. Research has demonstrated that options with
noncomparable attributes (Johnson, 1984) are more difficult to compare because the differences
inherent to these options do not align on the same scales. We hypothesized that this difference in
alignability, or outcome comparability, could account for the differences in affect-rich and
affect-poor choice. If this hypothesis were correct, making the affect-rich outcomes more
comparable, by utilizing choices between options involving the same side effect varying in level
of severity, should have improved choice accuracy relative to affective contexts comparing
different side effects, and should have eliminated or at least reduced the differences in choice
accuracy between the affect-rich and affect-poor choice sets.
Contrary to our predictions, we did not find evidence that differences in affect-rich and
affect-poor choice could be attributed to fundamental differences in the comparability of
outcomes within choice pairs. Even when making comparisons between side effects representing
the same continuum (e.g., slight insomnia versus moderate insomnia rather than insomnia versus
dizziness), the pattern of findings of Pachur and colleagues remained unchanged. Choice among
affect-rich side effects was not facilitated by making outcomes more comparable to one another.
Overall, we did not observe any benefit when having participants make decisions
between the same side effect that varied in intensity. Although the outcomes were described on
an ordered scale from slight to moderate to severe, individuals did not seem to treat them as
though they existed on a numeric scale (or on whatever level scale would be needed) in order to
effectively integrate this information with probability. Without this quantitative valuation of the
outcome, the combination with probability may be hindered.
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Outcome Precision.
Another component of outcomes that differs in the affect-rich and affect-poor contexts
used previously by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter,
Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) is the degree to which the outcomes describe a precise amount. The
affect-poor outcomes used were exact numeric values, while the affect-rich outcomes were
names of side effects, which did not specify specific amounts or intensities. In Study 3, we
attempted to remove the advantage of precise outcomes from the affect-poor context by using
numeric ranges as the affect-poor monetary outcomes (e.g., a small amount, $15-$29). In this
way, both the affect-rich and the affect-poor contexts shared a similar level of vagueness. If
affect-rich choices are hampered by the vagueness of outcomes such as side effects, we expected
that introducing vagueness into the monetary outcomes would decrease choice quality,
eliminating or reducing the differences in affect-rich and affect-poor contexts seen previously by
Pachur and colleagues.
As predicted, when monetary outcomes were described in less precise terms using
numeric ranges the difference in affect-rich and affect-poor choice disappeared in the standard
choice format. This resulted because of a drop in performance in the numeric condition of the
affect-poor lotteries. Furthermore, there was a noticeable difference in performance in the
numeric conditions of Studies 2 and 3, with choice for the more vague affect-poor outcomes in
Study 3 falling below that of the precise affect-poor outcomes in Study 2. Therefore, when the
information was more vague, and the probability was only displayed numerically, individuals’
choice suffered.
When using the precise monetary values, as was done in Studies 1 and 2, there are few
obstacles to integrating probability and outcome information, because both share a similar scale
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and the same attributes, with quantitative amounts depicted in exact terms. Furthermore, it is
relatively straightforward to combine these precise outcome values with the probability
information presented. However, it appears that the integration of the outcome and probability
information became more difficult in Study 3 when vagueness was introduced and an array was
not available. Research has demonstrated that integrating probability and outcomes is more
complex when working with less precise nonmonetary outcomes (McGraw et al., 2010). As the
vagueness present in the affect-poor outcomes was intended to be similar to that inherent in the
affect-rich, it is likely that the difficulty with integration observed for the side effects may have
carried over into the vague monetary outcomes.
One reason that integration of probability and outcome information is so difficult with
non-numeric outcomes is because individuals do not intuitively assign a numeric monetary value
to a non-numeric outcome (McGraw et al. 2010; Nunes & Park, 2003). For example, Nunes and
Park (2003) used a paradigm based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1984) calculator-jacket
problem. In the standard version, participants were asked about their willingness to travel 15
minutes to save $10 on a $25 item or to travel the same distance for the same savings on a $125
item. They found a greater tendency for individuals to travel to save the $10 on the $25 item than
the $125 item. However, when the $10 savings was replaced by a gift umbrella (a non-monetary
outcome estimated to have a $10 value), the effect disappeared. Thus, it appears that individuals
did not intuitively translate the perceived worth of the umbrella into its monetary value before
choice; if this were the case, the original effect would likely have been replicated.
Nunes and Park (2003) define situations such as this as having incommensurate
resources, in which something of value cannot be straightforwardly converted into a single
currency or common unit of measurement. If individuals do not automatically assign a numeric
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monetary value to a non-numeric outcome, the ability to integrate this non-numeric outcome
with relevant probability information is difficult (McGraw et al. 2010). As the affect-poor
outcomes of Study 3 share a level of vagueness inherent in many non-numeric outcomes, it is
reasonable to suggest that the difficulties seen with combining probability and outcome
information in a vague non-numeric context could also transfer over to this vague numeric
context. Thus, by using vague outcomes in the affect-poor context, we created a situation that
mimicked the affect-rich, in which integration of the probability and outcome information was
challenging. It is reasonable to suggest that this lead to an elimination of the differences
previously observed in affect-rich and affect-poor choice.
Theoretical Implications and Applications
Though Pachur and colleagues’(Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter,
Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) previously considered preferences in each affective context to be
related to affect’s ability to serve “as a spotlight,” (see Peters, 2006), or act “as information,”
(see Schwartz & Clore, 1983), differences in choice based on affective context can also be
considered with respect to a dual-systems framework. Dual-systems or dual-types (Evans &
Stanovich, 2013) approaches posit that there are distinct cognitive systems that are utilized in
decision-making. System 1 is often classified as automatic or heuristic, fast, and deals with basic
emotions, whereas System 2 is deliberative, controlled, slow, and analytic (Evans & Stanovich,
2013). Using this system classification, affect-rich decisions are typically seen as falling under
System 1 control, whereas affect-poor are more often associated with System 2.
However, it appears that System 1 versus 2 control becomes less distinct when the affectpoor outcomes are made less precise. It is possible that in the absence of precision, the analytic
processes central to System 2 are challenged. When deliberate, analytical, processes cannot be
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used, decision making may then be left to be controlled by the more-heuristic System 1.
Although affect-based decisions routinely fall under System 1 processing, here we see the
possibility that System 1 may also intervene when less affective information is not precise.
We are often in situations in which we must make decisions between things that involve
some level of affect, and these decisions are frequently about things that are not precise. For
example, options may not be especially precise when deciding on which restaurant to visit for
dinner, which model car to buy, or where to go on vacation. In the present research, we found
that decision making when affect is involved is not just about the feeling state, but that may also
be impacted by a lack of precision present in the decision context. Therefore, in all of these
examples, it is important to learn how lack of precision, versus feelings states per se, may
influence which strategies are employed to make a decision, and which preferences result.
Limitations and Future Directions
This research presents initial evidence of a possible explanation for the affect gap
described by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur,
& Hertwig, 2015). Pachur and colleagues attribute differences in affect-rich and affect-poor
choice to probability insensitivity, which results from the feeling states triggered with stronger
affective outcomes. However, we observed that there are other components to these affect-rich
outcomes that help explain the differences observed, namely, outcome precision.
In the present research, we demonstrated that affect-poor performance can deteriorate
when the outcomes are made to be similar to the affect-rich, by inserting vagueness. However,
whether the differences in affect-rich and affect-poor choice can continue to be eliminated when
the affect-rich outcomes are more precise remains to be seen. One benefit to exploring decision
making when both affective contexts are precise, is that it would further clarify whether
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differences in choice could be due to issues with integration of probability and outcome
information. In this test, any difficulty with integration of probability and outcome information
would presumably be eliminated, as the outcome would be both precise and numeric in both
affective contexts.
One way in which this could be assessed, is by utilizing an affective stimulus that
incorporates exact numeric values as the affect-rich outcomes, for example, those associated with
pain. We would expect that if integration was an issue underlying the differences in choice in
each affective context, making the affect-rich outcome information exact would raise choice in
this context to be similar to levels of the affect-poor.
This test of precision would also help to isolate the affect present in the affect-rich
outcomes and make it less different from monetary outcomes, but it may not eliminate all the
non-emotional differences between the outcomes. Working to eliminate these differences would
further elucidate whether the presence of the feeling states of affect could account for the
differences in affect-rich and affect-poor choice when other components inherent in affect are
held constant (e.g., precision). Future research must continue to try and isolate the emotional
component so that findings are not misattributed to the feeling states of affect, when it is
plausible that it could be another component, such as vagueness.
In our study, we made the affect-poor outcomes less precise, in an attempt to better match
the vagueness that characterized the affect-rich outcomes. With respect to the side effects, they
are inherently vague or fuzzy, as they do not have specific borders or boundaries (Naess &
Gullvag, 1996). However, working with the less precise numerical values still allowed for
boundaries to be known (e.g. $15-$29 has a definite starting and ending amount), perhaps
making them ambiguous rather than inherently vague. Therefore, it appears that there is still a
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fundamental difference in working with numerical and non-numerical information, even when
trying to match them in terms of vagueness. To help correct this, we utilized finite ranges in the
affect-rich side effects by incorporating the intensity scale. However, future research may benefit
from a focus on what it means to be working with less precise information and how this
information may differ in terms of constructs such as vagueness or ambiguity.
The present research focused on outcomes in the negative domain; however research has
found the affect gap in both the negative and positive domains (Pachur et al., 2014). Specifically,
Pachur and colleagues (2014) found that individuals’ choice was worse when comparing affectrich hotel amenities than affect-poor monetary outcomes. It would be worthwhile to explore
whether manipulating outcome precision in the affect-poor context would also lead to an
elimination of the affect gap in the positive domain. If a discrepancy in outcome precision is an
underlying explanation for the affect gap, we expect that this result would generalize across
domains.
Finally, we utilized a college sample, which demonstrates that differences in affect-rich
and affect-poor choice can be replicated in a highly educated sample from the United States. Our
results further show that the differences in choice seen previously in the general population of
the United States and Germany (Pachur & Galesic, 2012), and in a college population in
Switzerland (Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015), can be eliminated by
decreasing affect-poor outcome precision. The use of a college population is ubiquitous in
psychological research; however it is important to determine whether this finding is robust and
would generalize to the original populations used in this line of research, as well as other
populations of interest. The inability to generalize would suggest that the capacity to eliminate
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differences in choice is limited to a very specific population, namely, highly educated individuals
in the United States. We do not expect this would be the case.
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Conclusion
Affect is ubiquitous in daily life and many decisions that we make involve affect in some
form. Though affect is most commonly thought of as feeling states, outcomes rich with affect are
multidimensional. In the present research, we examined some of these dimensions as potential
causes underlying differences in choice for affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes. We explored
the possibility that differences were due to probability insensitivity, and if so, attempted to
correct this problem by making likelihoods salient in an icon array. However, we also
investigated an alternative explanation, namely, that differences exist because of characteristics
inherent in the outcomes themselves: the outcome comparability and/or outcome precision. Our
results provided initial evidence for an alternative explanation to that provided by Pachur and
colleagues (Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) for the
affect gap, specifically, that differences exist due to an imbalance in the outcome precision that
exists in affect-rich and affect-poor choice.
It appears that it is difficult to choose well when the outcome information is vague, which
is potentially the result of a challenge integrating probability with the outcome. However, this
does not rule out the possibility that the feeling state of affect isn’t involved in the discrepancies
between affect-rich and affect-poor choice. Though affect has been deemed integral in guiding
choice (Damasio, 1994) there may be any number of ways in which affect can influence our
decisions. As was demonstrated here, these may go beyond the feelings themselves to include
other characteristics, such as their qualitative and imprecise nature. This research is a first step in
providing a viable explanation for the affect gap found by Pachur and colleagues (Pachur &
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Galesic, 2012; Pachur et al., 2014; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2015) and contributes to our
understanding of how and why affect-rich and affect-poor choice may differ.

96

References
Ancker, J. S., Senathrajah, Y., Kukafka, R., & Starren, J. B. (2006). Design features of graphs in
health risk communication : A systematic review. Journal of the American Medical
Informatics Association, 13(6), 608–619. http://doi.org/10.1197/jamia.M2115.Introduction
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of
economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 52(2), 336–372.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.010
Bogardus, S. T., Holmboe, E., & Jekel, J. F. (1999). Perils, pitfalls, and possibilities in talking
about medical risk, 281(11), 1037–1041. http://doi.org/10.1001/jama.281.11.1037
Cox, D. S., Cox, A. D., Sturm, L., & Zimet, G. (2010). Behavioral interventions to increase HPV
vaccination acceptability among mothers of young girls. Health Psychology, 29(1), 29–39.
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0016942
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York:
Penguin Putnam.
Evans, J.S.B., & Stanovich, K.E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing
the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223-241.
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in
judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1-17.
http://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.151.3712.867-a

97
Galesic, M., Garcia-Retamero, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2009). Using icon arrays to communicate
medical risks: overcoming low numeracy. Health Psychology, 28(2), 210–216.
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014474
Garcia-Retamero, R., & Galesic, M. (2010). Who proficts from visual aids: Overcoming
challenges in people’s understanding of risks. Social Science and Medicine, 70(7), 1019–
1025. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.11.031
Garcia-Retamero, R., Galesic, M., & Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Do icon arrays help reduce
denominator neglect? Medical Decision Making, 30(6), 672–684.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X10369000
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction:
Frequency formats. Psychological review, 102(4), 684.
Glockner, A., & Pachur, T. (2012). Cognitive models of risky choice: Parameter stability and
predictive accuracy of prospect theory. Cognition, 123(1), 21–32.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.12.002
Hawley, S. T., Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Ubel, P. A., Jancovic, A., Lucas, T., & Fagerlin, A.
(2008). The impact of the format of graphical presentation on health-related knowledge and
treatment choices. Patient Education and Counseling, 73(3), 448–455.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2008.07.023
Hess, R., Visschers, V. H. M., & Siegrist, M. (2011). Risk communication with pictographs: The
role of numeracy and graph processing. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(3), 263–274.
Hoffrage, U., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Using natural frequencies to improve diagnostic
inferences. Academic medicine, 73(5), 538-40.

98
Johnson, M. D. (1984). Consumer Choice Strategies for Comparing Noncomparable
Alternatives. Journal of Consumer Research, 11(3), 741–753.
http://doi.org/10.1086/209010
Johnson, M. D. (1986). Modeling choice strategies for noncomparable alternatives. Marketing
Science, 5(1), 37–54. http://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.5.1.37
Jolly, B., Scott, J., & Sanford, S. (1995). Simplification of emergency department discharge
instructions improves patient comprehension. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 26, 443-446.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values and frames. American Psychologist,
39(4), 341-350.
Kuhn, K. M., Budescu, D. V, Hershey, J. R., Kramer, K. M., & Rantilla, A. K. (1999). Attribute
tradeoffs in low probability/high consequence risks: The joint effects of dimension
preference and vagueness. Risk Decision and Policy, 4(1), 31–46.
http://doi.org/10.1080/135753099348085
Lipkus, I. M. (2007). Numeric, verbal, and visual formats of conveying health risks: suggesting
best practices and future recommendations. Medical Decision Making, 27(5), 696–713.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X07307271
Lipkus, I. M., Samsa, G., & Rimer, B. K. (2001). General performance on a numeracy scale
among highly educated samples. Medical Decision Making, 21(1), 37–44.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X0102100105
Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of affect in decision making. In R. J. Davidson,
K. R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of Affective Science (619–642). Oxford:
Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-62604-2.00003-4

99
McGraw, A. P., Shafir, E., & Todorov, A. (2010). Valuing money and things: Why a $20 item
can be worth more and less than $20. Management Science, 56(5), 816–830.
http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1147
Naess, A. & Gullvag, I. (1996). Vagueness and ambiguity. The Trumpeter, 22(1), 56-74.
Nunes, J.C., & Park, C.W. (2003). Incommensurate resources: Not just more of the same.
Journal of Marketing Research, 40(1), 26-38.
Pachur, T., & Galesic, M. (2012). Strategy selection in risky choice: The impact of numeracy,
affect, and cross-cultural differences. The Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(3),
260–271. http://doi.org/10.1002/bdm
Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., & Wolkewitz, R. (2014). The affect gap in risky choice: Affect-rich
outcomes attenuate attention to probability information. Decision, 1(1), 64–78.
http://doi.org/10.1037/dec0000006
Peters, E., Dieckmann, N., Dixon, A., Hibbard, J.H., & Mertz, C.K. (2007). Less is more in
presenting quality information to consumers. Medical Care Research and Review, 64(2),
169-190.
Peters, E., Hibbard, J., Slovic, P., & Dieckmann, N. (2007). Numeracy skill and the
communication, comprehension, and use of risk-benefit information. Health Affairs, 26(3),
741–748. http://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.26.3.741
Peters, E., & Levin, I.P. (2008). Dissecting the risky choice framing effect: Numeracy as an
individual-difference factor in weighting risky and riskless options. Judgment and Decision
Making, 3(6), 435-448.
Peters, E., Vastfjall, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C.K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy
and decision making. Psychological Science, 17(5), 407-413.

100
Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001). Money, kisses, and electric shocks: on the affective
psychology of risk. Psychological Science, 12(3), 185–190. http://doi.org/10.1111/14679280.00334
Savage, L. J. (1951). The theory of statistical decision. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 46(253), 55–67.
Schapira, M. M., Nattinger, A. B., & McHorney, C. A. (2001). Frequency or probability? A
qualitative study of risk communication formats used in health care. Medical Decision
Making, 21(6), 459-467.
Schirillo, J. A., & Stone, E. R. (2005). The greater ability of graphical versus numerical displays
to increase risk avoidance involves a common mechanism. Risk Analysis, 25(3), 555–566.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00624.x
Schwartz, L. M., Wolshin, S., Black, W. C., & Welch, H. G. (1997). The role of numeracy in
understanding the benefit of screening mamography. Ann Intern Med, 127(11), 966–972.
http://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-127-11-199712010-00003
Smithson, M., & Oden, G. C. (1999). Fuzzy set theory and applications in psychology.
In Practical Applications of fuzzy technologies (557-585). Springer US.
Suter, R. S., Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2015). How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted
Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
29, 437-449. http://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1888
Suter, R.S., Pachur, T., Hertwig,R., Endestad, T., and Biele, G. (2015). The neural basis of risky
choice with affective outcomes. PLoS One, 10(4), 1-22.

101
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory - Cumulative representation
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. http://doi.org/Doi
10.1007/Bf00122574
Wallsten, T. S., Budescu, D. V, Rapoport, A., Zwick, R., & Forsyth, B. (1986). Measuring the
vague meanings of probability terms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
115(4), 348–365. http://doi.org/10.1037//0096-3445.115.4.348
Waters, E. A., Weinstein, N. D., Colditz, G. A., & Emmons, K. M. (2007). Aversion to side
effects in preventive medical treatment decisions. British Journal of Health Psychology,
13(1), 11-21. http://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.13.1.11
Weller, J. A., Dieckmann, N. F., Tusler, M., Mertz, C. K., Burns, W. J., & Peters, E. (2013).
Development and testing of an abbreviated numeracy scale: A Rasch analysis approach.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(2), 198–212. http://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1751
Zhang, S., & Markman, A. B. (2001). Processing product unique features: Alignability and
involvement in preference construction. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 11(1), 13–27.
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP1101_2
Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Fagerlin, A., & Ubel, P. A. (2008). Improving understanding of adjuvant
therapy options by using simpler risk graphics. Cancer, 113(12), 3382–3390.
http://doi.org/10.1002/cncr.23959

